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I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past century, fertility behavior in the United States has
undergone profound changes. Measured by cohort fertility, the aver-
age number of children per married woman has declined from about
5.5childrenat the time of the Civil War to 2.4 children at the time of
the Great Depression. It is seldom emphasized, however, that an
even greater relative change took place in the dispersion of fertility
among these women: the percentage of women with, say, seven or
more children declined from 36 per cent to under 6 per cent.' While
students of population have offered reasonably convincing explana-
tions for the decline in fertility over time, they have not succeeded
in explaining the fluctuations in the trend and have made surprisingly
*Thisstudy has been supported by a population economics program grant to the
NBER from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, Public
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. We want to thank Lee
A. Lillard for useful suggestions and C. Ates Dagli, Kathleen V. McNally, and Joan
Robinson for their careful research assistance.
'These figures are taken from the report of the President's Commission on Popula-
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little effort to explain the large and systematic decline in the dispersion
of fertility over time. In this paper, we attempt to study contraception
behavior and its effects on fertility. One of the effects on which we
focus considerable attention is the dispersion, or variance, in fertility.
Our analysis is applied to cross-sectional data but it also provides an
explanation for the decline in the variance of fertility over time.
The study of fertility behavior has received increasing attention by
economists in the past few years. Much of this analysis has been con-
ducted in the context of the new theory of consumer behavior pio-
neered by Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966). The work on fertility
behavior complements many other studies dealing with aspects of
household production. One of the specific topics in the fertility litera-
ture has been the relationship between childbearing and several life-
cycle production decisions, such as marriage, schooling, women's
career choices, life-cycle time and money allocations, and so forth.
A second and related topic of the economics of fertility behavior is
the tradeoff in household production between the family's number of
children and the expenditure of resources per child, particularly the
expenditure of time devoted to children at the preschool age. A third
focus of this research has been the fertility demand function—the
form and stability over time and across groups of the household's de-
mand function for children.2
Nearly all of these studies of household fertility behavior assume
that the household can produce exactly the number of children it
wants, costlessly and with certainty. We have previously pointed out
that costly fertility control operates as a subsidy to childbearing, lower-
ing the marginal cost of having additional children (see Willis 1971)
and we have suggested a framework for analyzing the household's
fertility control decisions (see Michael 1973). In this paper, we con-
sider the household's fertility control behavior both in terms of the
selection of specific fertility control strategies (the costs and benefits
of specific contraceptive techniques) and in terms of the effects of
different control strategies on household fertility.
One could introduce fertility control costs into a deterministic model
of fertility behavior by treating these costs as transaction costs asso-
ciated with acquiring any given level of fertility. In this framework,
2 athorough model of fertility demand and the quantity.quality tradeoffs in the
context of a static framework, see Willis (1973). For an extensive set of papers pertaining
to topics in fertility behavior see the two NBER conference volumes, NewEconomic
Approachesto Fertility and Marriage, Family Human Capital and Fertility, Schultz,
ed., (1973) and (1974). These volumes indicate, we think, that much of observed
fertility behavior is amenable to economic analysis.
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0 1—2 3—4 5—6
CohortChildrenChildrenChildrenChildrenChildrenChildren
1835—39 5.40 7.7 17.3 20.0 18.7 36.3
1845—49 5.27 8.2 18.5 20.3 18.3 34.8
1855—59 4.97 8.9 20.6 21.3 17.9 31.3
1865—69 3.90 12.3 26.6 26.1 16.0 18.9
1875—79 3.46 15.0 30.4 25.2 14.4 15.0
1885—89 3.15 16.6 33.1 25.1 13.1 12.2
1895—99 2.71 18.6 39.0 23.9 10.0 8.4
1905—09 2.36 20.8 43.2 22.4 7.8 5.9
1915—19 2.60 13.9 43.7 28.1 8.9 5.4
1926—30 3.08 8.0 36.5 36.2 12.3 7.0
SOURCE: Taeuber 1972 (with the exception of the most recent cohort, the women
were at least age 45atthe time of the enumeration; for the 1926—30 cohort the women
were 40—44 at the time of the survey.)
the household can select any number of children with certainty, pro-
vided it pays the requisite costs of fertility control. Assuming that total
fertility control costs are larger the smaller the number of children
chosen, the positive marginal cost of fertility control raises average
fertility by acting as a subsidy to childbearing. In this paper, we have
treated the costs of fertility control in a somewhat different frame-
work. We have adopted a model in which the household can select
with certainty any particular monthly probability of conception,3 but
in which the household's actual fertility N is a stochastic variable. By
selecting and producing a particular monthly probability of concep-
tion, the household selects a distribution of fertility outcomes. The
mean of that distribution is its expected fertility; its variance indicates
the uncertainty that the household faces.
As Table 1 indicates, the decline in average fertility over the past
century has been accompanied by a significant reduction in the dis-
persion of fertility. The stochastic model of fertility control which
3The probability is bounded by zero and by the probability implied by natural or
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we discuss in the following section emphasizes the relationship be-
tween the mean and variance of fertility, and offers an explanation
for the observed decline in the dispersion in fertility over time.
Child rearing is an exceptionally costly activity, both in terms of
direct dollar outlays and forgone time and human capital.4 Few events
in one's lifetime affect subsequent behavior more extensively than
having a child. While other important life-cycle decisions, such as
marriage and career choice, are subject to considerable uncertainty,
the uncertainty generally pertains to the quality or the characteristics
of the object of choice. Of course, uncertainty about the characteristics
of the prospective child exists, but in addition there is another uncer-
tainty, the one which we are emphasizing: uncertainty about the
acquisition itself.
At the individual household level, this uncertainty about the num-
ber of children affects at least three aspects of behavior. First, it may
affect decisions about the expenditures of resources on existing
children—if ordinary substitution between quantity and quality is
relevant to children, then not knowing the final number of children may
affect the household's expenditure decisions on its early children. Sec-
ond, there is the possibility of substitution between expenditures on
children and on other household goods and services, and also between
expenditures over time. Consequently, uncertainty about the number
of children, and about the timing or spacing of children, can be expected
to affect the composition and timing of consumer expenditure and
savings behavior. Third, because of important interactions with other
household production and with the relative value of family members'
time, uncertainty about the number of children may have effects on
the parents' occupation choices, schooling decisions, and general
orientation toward market and household activities.
At the aggregate level, positive fertility control costs and the
stochastic nature of fertility behavior affect the observed mean and
variance of fertility. The size and growth rate of the population affect
the age distribution of the population—and the rate of growth and the
composition of the economy's output.5 The variance in fertility, on
For estimates of the direct costs of children, see Cain (1971) or Reed and Mcintosh
(1972). Lindert (1973) presents a useful discussion of existing evidence on various
aspects of the costs of children. Michael and Lazear (1971) emphasize the potential
cost of children in terms of forgone human capital, and Mincer and Polachek (1974)
estimate the depreciation in the mother's human capital related to her nonmarket child-
rearing activity.
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the other hand, influences the distribution of income and of wealth.
If uncertainty about fertility outcomes affects household investment
and savings decisions, it may have an important influence on the dis-
tribution of inherited wealth across generations.
These considerations are not the focus of our paper, but we think
the points we emphasize here —thecosts of fertility control, fertility
as a stochastic process, and the relationship between the mean and
variance of fertility—have important implications for the level and
distribution of the economy's wealth. We do not explore these aggre-
gate relationships, nor do we resolve many of the more esoteric prob-
lems which we encounter in our analysis. We do, however, attempt to
integrate into an analysis of contraceptive choice and optimum
fertility behavior the constraints imposed by biological limitations
and resource (or economic) limitations. We indicate how the choice
of contraceptive technique affects the observed mean and variance of
fertility. We also analyze the choice of contraceptive technique, in
particular the adoption of the new oral contraceptive in the United
States in the first half of the 1960s.
II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The theory of the choice of a fertility control strategy treats the fer-
tility goals of the household as given, while the economic theory of
fertility demand focuses on the factors which determine these goals.
If fertility control is costly, however, these costs, as well as the re-
source costs of bearing and rearing children, influence the couple's
choice of fertility goals. The link between the theory of the choice
of birth control technique and the theory of fertility behavior is pro-
vided by assuming that the household maximizes its lifetime utility,
subject to the constraint of a fertility control cost function, as well as
to the conventional economic resource constraint. The fertility control
cost function is simply the combination (the envelope) of least-cost
birth control strategies for all possible fertility outcomes.
In this section, we describe a stochastic model of reproduction, em-
phasizing the relationship between the mean and variance of fertility
outcomes. We then discuss the economic benefits and costs of fertility
control and conclude with an exposition of the optimal fertility control
strategy.
progress. See Kuznets (1960) and other essays in Demographicand Economic Change
in Developed Countries fordiscussions of the effects of population on output employ-
ment and demand.32 DemographicBehavior of the Household
A.Birth Control and the Distribution of Fertility Outcomes
Thenumber of children born to a couple and the pace at which these
children are born is ultimately constrained by the fact that reproduc-
tion is a biological process. The observed reproductive behaviOr of
an individual woman over her life cycle may be regarded as the out-
come of this biological process, as modified by nonvolitional social and
cultural factors and by the effects of deliberate attempts to control
fertility. In the past two decades, the nature of thebiological con-
straint on fertility choices has been greatly clarified and given rigorous
expression in stochastic models of the reproductive process by Henry,
Potter, Perrin and Sheps, and others. The basic reasoning underlying
these models and their main implications for average fertility were
recently summarized by Keyfitz (1971).
These models suggest that the number of children a woman bears
during her lifetime is a random variable whose mean and variance
depend on her (and her partner's) choice of a fertility control strategy.
In this section, we draw heavily on this literature in order to present,
under simplifying assumptions, analytical expressions for the mean
and variance of live births as a function of two sets of parameters,
one representing the couple's biological characteristics and the other
its fertility control strategy.
The simple observation that it takes a random amount of time to
produce a baby provides the point of departure for recent biological
models of fertility. Suppose that a woman faces a probability p of
conceiving in a given month. If that monthly probability of conception
is constant over time, the probability that she will conceive in exactly
thejthmonth(j= 1,2,...)isp(1
ability that she fails to conceive in the first f —Imonths. Employing
the demographer's term "conceptive delay," i.e., the number of months
v it takes a fecund woman to conceive, the random variable v is dis-
tributed geometrically with mean pS,,= (1—p)/p andvariance
(1 —p)/p2.6
Once a woman conceives, she becomes sterile during her preg-
nancy and the anovulatory period following pregnancy. The length
of the sterile period s is also a random variable whose value depends
on the type of pregnancy termination (i.e., fetal loss or stillbirth or
live birth) and on the physiological and social factors (e.g., age, parity,
breast-feeding practices, time until resumption of sexual activity)
6See Sheps (1964) for a derivation of this result. It should be noted that conceptive
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which determine the length of the anovulatory period following each
type of pregnancy termination. For simplicity, we shall assume that
all pregnancies terminate inlive birth and that the length of the
sterile period sisof fixed, nonrandom length.7 The length of one
reproductive cycle—the number of months it takes a fecund woman
to become pregnant, give birth, and revert to a fecund, nonpregnant
status —canbe expressed as t =v+ s, a random variable with mean
=+ s and variance=
Thenumber of children the woman bears during a lifetime, say a
reproductive span of T months, depends on the number of reproduc-
tivë cycles completed during this period. Since each cycle is of random
length, the woman's fertility will also be a random variable. The prob-
ability distribution of the number of births can be represented in a
simple way if the model of reproduction is represented as a Markov
renewal process. In order to qualify as a renewal process, the intervals
between successive births must behave as independent, identically
distributed random variables (Potter 1970). To meet these qualifica-
tions, it is necessary to assume that all of the parameters of the re-
productive process (i.e., p and s) are constant over time and that the
reproductive period, T, is sufficiently long (i.e., infinity). Assuming
reproduction to be a renewal process, the distribution of the number







1 Perrinand Sheps (1964) for a model in which pregnancy terminations other than
live births are allowed and the sterile period associated with each type of pregnancy is
of random length. Compared with the formulas we shall present, the Perrin and Sheps
model implies a smaller mean and larger variance in the number of live births a woman
has over her reproductive span.
8SeeSheps and Perrin (1966), who warn that the asymptotic normal distribution
above does not adequately approximate the exact probability of N for the relevant
(finite) range of T. In another paper, Perrin and Sheps (1964) suggest more accurate
approximate expressions for the first two moments of N. Since the qualitative implica-
tions of these approximations are quite similar to those of the more exact approxima-
tions, it does not seem necessary to encumber the discussion with more complicated
expressions for mean and variance. A more serious problem is suggested by Jam(1968),
who found that the actual mean of natural fertility tends to fall progressively below the
theoretical mean given by the Perrin-Sheps model as T increases, while actual variance
rises progressively above the theoretical variance..
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Equations I and 2 provide a useful way of summarizing the insights
into the determinants of a woman's fertility behavior provided by
mathematical demography. Her mean fertility varies in direct propor-
tion with the length of her reproductive span T and in inverse propor-
tion with the expected length of her reproductive cycle. The variance
of her fertility outcome depends upon these same two factors and also
upon the variance in the length of her reproductive cycle. The three
variables which determine both the mean fertilityandthe variance
of fertility inthis framework are the length of the reproductive
span T, the monthly probability of conception p, and the length of
the sterile period s following conception. Given T, p, and s, the mean
and variance are jointly determined. Treating T and s as parameters,
the mean and variance of N are related, at all values of p, as






where k1 and k2 are positive constants.
Consider, next, the determinants of the monthly probability of con-
ception p. A woman's biological capacity to reproduce may be repre-
sented by her intrinsic fecundability j3,whichis defined as the prob-
ability of conception from a single unprotected act of coition at a
random time during the menstrual cycle (which is assumed to be one
month in length). In the absence of conception, the probability p that
she will conceive during a given month is then equal to the product of
/3 and her monthly frequency of coition c.9 Demographers frequently
discuss "natural fertility" defined, following Henry (1961), as the
number of live births a woman expects to have in a reproductive life-
span of T months in the absence of any deliberate attempt to control
fertility. If we suppose there is some "natural" level of coital fre-
quency ê for a given couple, then éj3= p",the couple's monthly prob-
ability of conception in the absence of any fertility control. We will
generally assume C =7and p= 0.03 (see Tietze 1960), hence we will
assume that p" =0.2.Givenand given the reproductive time span
T and the length of the period of infertility s, the mean and variance
of natural fertility, and are defined by equations 1 and 2.
Intrinsic fecundability is discussed in the demographic literature, which contains an
empirical justification for expressing p as approximately proportional to coyerthe
relevant range of variation in monthly frequency of coition.FIGURE 1
A Theoretical Relationship between Mean and Variance of
Fertility (See Equation 3)
1 2 345678910 11121314151617181920
Variations across couples in the monthly probability of conception
p may result from variations in fecundity—which affect j3—or from
variations in coital frequency. Vanations may also result from contra-
ception. If the adoption of a particular contraceptive strategy i reduces
the monthly probability of conception by e, per cent, then
pjp*(l_e.)
So the couple's actual monthly probability of conception p, is deter-
mined by its fecundity, cóital frequency, and contraceptive practice.
As we emphasized above, to qualify as a Markov renewal process of
reproduction the monthly probability pj is assumed to be constant for
all fertile months in the reproductive time span of T months. Under
these circumstances Figure 1 indicates the relationship between the
mean and variance of fertility as summarized in equation 3. Curve A
assumes T =240months (a reproductive span of 20 years) and s =17
months (a 17-month period of sterility following conception, see Key-
fitz 1971). Each point on curve A corresponds to a different constant
monthly probability of conception ranging from p =0.0(the origin) to
p =0:2(point f on the curve).'0 Curve B in Figure 1 depicts the same
10Forexample, if p =0.0008then= 0.19births and 0.18, which is shown
as point a on curve A. The values of p which correspond to points a, b,c,d,e,fin the
figure are 0.0008, 0.0120, 0.0182, 0.0336, 0.1000, 0.2000 respectively. These values
refer to specific forms of fertility control and are discussed below.
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"In reality, it is plausible to suppose that the frequency of coition and contraceptive
efficiency will tend to vary over time to accommodate a couple's preferences for child
spacing as well as for total number of births, or to accommodate any changes in their
fertility goals.
It is also plausible to suppose that the choices of candewillbe conditioned on past
pregnancy and birth outcomes. Thus, in general, the values of p in a given month will
tend to be a function of time (i.e., age), past reproductive history (i.e., parity), and
random fluctuations in variables that determine fertility goals.
Unfortunately, the analytical simplicity of considering the stochastic model of repro-
duction as a renewal process is lost under these conditions. While it is possible to write
out probability statements in which a couple's contraceptive strategy (i.e., its choices
of cande,)isdefined conditional on all possible fertility outcomes at each period of
time, it is not possible to derive the implications of the resulting stochastic process for
completed fertility outcomes using analytic methods. Moreover, the dynamic optimiza-
tion problem involved in selecting a contraceptive strategy that maximizes a couple's
expected utility under conditions of uncertainty may itself be analytically intractable.
At this stage, it appears wiser to minimize the formal difficulties, thus the contraceptive
parameters cande,,aswell as the biological parameters, 5 and s,areassumed to remain
constant over time.
12Interruptionsof exposure within the time span T caused by cessations of sexual
relations due to divorce or separation are ruled out by the assumption that the parameters
of the process remain constant over time.
relationship under the assumption that T equals 240 months, and s
equals only 11 months.
Suppose a couple, at the time of their marriage, were characterized
by the parameter values T =240months, s =17months, and p" =
0.2.They would then face an ex ante distribution of fertility outcomes
with a mean of 11.4 births and a variance of 0.5 (point! on curve A in
Figure 1). The couple could, however, alter this outcome by
adopting a strategy of fertility control which lowered their constant
monthly probability of conception below pg'.If, for example, the
couple selected a contraceptive technique with efficiency e1 =0.5,
then their monthly probability would be p =p*(1—0.5)=0.1and
their ex ante distribution of fertility outcomes would have a mean of
9.2 births and a variance of 1.2 (point e on curve A). Thus, the couple
affects its expected fertility and its uncertainty about the number of
its births by its selection of a contraceptive strategy."
Both the contraceptive technique used and the care with which it is
used can affectwhich in turn determines p1. In general, the couple
can also affect p. by altering its frequency of coition c and can also
affect the distribution of fertility outcomes for any given p, by altering
the length of the reproductive period at risk T through decisions about
the age at marriage and the age at which either partner is sterilized.'2
So the full range of fertility control strategies includes considerations
other than the choice of contraceptive method, but it is the contra-
. . .
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ceptivechoice on which we will focus. By selecting contraceptive
strategy i, which yields a monthly probability of conception p•, the
couple has, in effect, selected a particular ex ante distribution of its
fertility outcomes. The mean of that distribution isand its variance
is We will assume for now that the couple is constrained to a pure
contraceptive strategy, defined as the adoption of some form of fer-
tility control which sets p at some fixed level (during fertile periods)
for the entire reproductive span.
From studies of the average contraceptive failure rates of various
contraceptive techniques, the efficiency-in-use of each technique can
be computed. Table 2 lists the contraceptive efficiency e,andthe im-
plied monthly probability of conception p1 for several contraceptive
techniques.13 The table also computes for each technique the mean
and variance of the length of the reproductive cycle and the mean
and variance of the fertility outcomes in a 20-year reproductive span.
Thus, given the biological constraint on its fertility (e.g., curve A in
Figure 1) the couple can determihe the expected distribution of its
fertility (itsand ONZ) by selecting a contraceptive strategy which
achieves any particular p1. The various points labeled on curve A
indicate the mean and variance of births associated with various con-
traceptive techniques (point a: pill; b: diaphragm; C: suppository; d:
rhythm; e:50per cent reduction in coital frequency and no other con-
traception; f: no fertility control).
In this framework, the number of children born to a couple is a ran-
dom variable which results from a stochastic process. Ex post, the
couple has only one number of children N. However, the couple can-
not determine its number of children with absolute certainty. Rather,
it can select any particular value of p. the monthly probability of con-
ception, which yields a particular distribution of fertility outcomes
summarized by the distribution's mean and variance.
So long as we assume that the couple selects one value for p and re-
tains that particular monthly probability of conception for all the fertile
months in the twenty-year span —anassumption we will characterize
as a "pure" strategy model—the couple cannot alter its expected
fertilitywithout also altering the variance CTN2.Inshort, the pure
estimates of contraceptive efficiency were compiled by Michael (1973) from
the demographic literature (see especially Tietze (1959)and(1962)). See Michael (1973)
for a discussion of the difficulties in estimating and the hazards in using this comparative
list of the efficiency of contraceptive methods. In particular, note that these values
represent average observed use-effectiveness and will, in general, be affected by the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,Contraception and Fertility 39
strategy model restricts the couple to the biological constraint (curve
A in Figure 1 if T =240,s =17).Before we relax the assumption of
the pure strategy, we discuss the determinants of the couple's choice
of its most preferred position along the biological constraint. We con-
sider in turn the benefits and the costs of fertility control.
B. Benefits of Fertility Control
Recent economic theories of household behavior postulate the
existence of several constraints (e.g., a money income constraint, a
time constraint, production function limitations) on the household's
maximization of utility. The utility is derived from a broad set of
desiderata which are produced by the household itself in the non-
market sector, using purchased market goods and services and the
household members' own time as the inputs in the production.14 These
production functions emphasize the distinction between the house-
hold's wants (the output) and the means used to satisfy these wants
(the goods and time inputs).
Willis (1973) recently utilized the household production framework
to formulate an economic model of human fertility behavior. We will
generalize a simple version of Willis's model to deal with imperfect and
costly fertility control. The formal analysis is conducted in a static
lifetime framework, although we informally suggest how the implica-
tions of the model might be altered in a more dynamic or sequential
decision-making framework.'5
In Willis's model, it is assumed that the satisfaction parents receive
from each of their N children is represented by Q1, Q2,..., and
the satisfaction from other sources of enjoyment is represented by S.
The or "quality," of each child, and the other composite com-
modity S are produced within and by the household using the family
members' time and purchased market goods as inputs. The household
production functions characterize the relationship between inputs
of time and goods and the outputs ofand S. Assuming (among other
things) that parents treat all their children alike, the total amount of
child services C may be written as a product of quality per child Q and
the number of children N: C =NQ.It is assumed that Q is positively
related to the amount of time and market goods devoted to each child—
14 Becker(1965) and Lancaster (1966) for early statements of this model. Several
monographs and articles in recent years, notably through NBER, have utilized this
framework. For a recent brief survey see Michael and Becker (1973).
"For a model of sequential decision making regarding contraceptive behavior in a
heterogeneous population see Heckman and Willis, this volume.40 DemographicBehavior of the Household
Q is perhaps best considered an index of the child's human capital.
The household's preferences for number and quality of children and
for all other forms of satisfaction are summarized by its lifetime utility
function.
U=U(N,Q,S) (4)
The household's capacity to produce C and S is limited by its life-
time real income and by the quantity of its nonmarket time. Willis
(1973) discusses in detail the relationship between the relative prices
of N and Q, and considers how various changes in the household's
characteristics and circumstances would be expected to affect its
demand for N, Q, and S.
One important implication of the economic model of fertility demand
should be noted. From an assumption that children are relatively
time intensive as regards the wife's time (i.e., C production requires
more of the wife's time per dollar of goods input than does S pro-
duction), the relative cost of C rises as the wife's wage rate rises.
Hence the cost of both number of children N and quality of children
Q also rises with the wife's wage rate. If the relative price of N rises
with the wife's wage rate, then abstracting from the change in income,
women with higher wages (or higher levels of education) are expected
to have lower fertility. This is the basis of the "cost of time" hy-
pothesis (Ben-Porath 1973), which has, since Mincer's pioneering
paper (1963), received much attention as an explanation for the ob-
served negative relationship between the wife's wage and her fertility.
The household's lifetime money income• constraint, its time con-
straint, and its production function constraints can be treated as a
single constraint on the household's lifetime full real income I. Defining
the marginal costs of child servicesandthe composite other com-
modity n-3, the formal optimization problem characterizing the house-
hold's choice is the maximization of the utility function (equation 4)
subject to the full real income constraint.
max { U(N, Q, S) —X[I— } (5)
where x is the Lagrange multiplier. This optimization problem as-
sumes that the household can costlessly and with certainty select any
number of children (N) it wishes and can achieve any given level of
the child's human capital (Q) it chooses.
To relax this assumption, we consider the benefits to the household
of achieving any given number of children. Suppose the household hadS..
Contraception and Fertility 41
theutility function and the full real income constraint indicated in
equation 5, but that the household was endowed with some arbitrary
number of children N', where N' =0,1 (To simplify the math-
ematics, N' will be treated as a continuous variable.) Given its arbi-
trary N', the household's only remaining choices would be the optimal
values of child quality, Q, and other satisfaction, S, which must be
chosen subject to the lifetime full real income constraint. If N and
Q as well as N and S are substitutes in terms of the parents' prefer-
ences, the levels of both Q and S will tend to fall as N' is increased.
This analysis implies that suboptimal values of Q and S would be
chosen if fertility were arbitrarily constrained. Q and S would tend to
be larger than (or smaller than) the optimal values, Q* and S*, as the
arbitrarily constrained level of fertility N' is smaller (or larger) than
the freely chosen desired level of fertility N*.l6
This hypothetical experiment of assigning some arbitrary N to the
household is equivalent to maximizing equation 5 while treating N
as a parameter, for all possible values of N. Such an exercise yields the
household's net utility level as a function of its assigned level of fer-
tility N' and the economic variables. Written as an implicit function
the net utility V is
V= V(N; 1, (6)
Foreach arbitrarily assigned value of N', there is a maximum achiev-
able level of utility, obtained by the appropriate mix of Q and S. By
definition, the maximum value of V, indicated as V*, will be achieved
at the desired level of N(N* =N'),as depicted on curve A in Figure 2.
Deviations of fertility from N* in either direction, such as N1 or
N2, result in reduced utility levels, such as V1 or V2, in curve A of
Figure 2. Given the emphasis in discussions of family planning on the
problem of excess fertility and unwanted births (i.e., N > N*), it is
worth stressing that deficit fertility (i.e., N < N*) may reduce welfare
by at least as much as excess fertility.'7
16Itshould be noted that we are implicitly assuming that the couple knows in advance
what number of children it wilt have and can plan accordingly for its level of child quality
and S.
indicated above, in the case of deficit fertility, quality per child, Q, would be
higher than it would be in the case of optimal fertility or a fortiori for excess fertility.
If from some ethical point of view, parents are judged to place too little weight on their
children's welfare, and if we measure child welfare by the level of Q,itcould be argued
that the effect on Qofdeficit fertility reduces or outweighs the parents' welfare loss




















The opportunity cost of deficit or excess fertility (V* —V1or V"
—V2)is a measure of the benefits from improved fertility control. If
in the absence of fertility control the household's fertility would have
been(yielding V1), but with a given level of fertility control the
household achieved N) (yielding I', such at then (V* —V1)
—(V*—= —V1is a measure of the benefit from that level of
fertility control. The utility benefits, then, are the gains in utility which
accrue from moving nearer the optimal allocation of resources which
would exist if fertility control were perfect and costless (i.e., N*,
Q* and S*).
We suggest above that the choice of particular values of fertility
control parameters such as e1yieldparticularante distributions of
fertility summarized by and Wecan, therefore, formulate the
discussion of the benefits of fertility control in terms ofand
Forpurposes of illustration, suppose the functional fOrm of equation
6isauadratic in N:
where 1, andir8 are held constant. Since the unconstrained maxi-(8)
We may now treat N as a random variable and take the expected value
of equation 7 to obtain:
(9)
Recallthat equation 3 indicates the relationship between TN2 and
/hN, = where ijjisa cubic function. If E(V0)isthe value
of equation 9 in the absence of any fertility control, and E(V1) is its
value when fertility control of e,(yielding is employed, then
the benefit from fertility control strategy i is —E(V0).
If we maximize the expected V (equation 9) with respect to
d c,
(10)
whereis a quadratic equation derived from equation 3. Noting that
iii' may be roughly approximated by a positive constant K, (tli'K)
for values < 5 (see Figure 1), the optimal value from equa-
tion 10 is
(11)
The optimal expected fertility j4issomewhat lower than the desired
fertility N*. Equation 9 implies that the lower the variance the
higher the net benefit V, ceteris paribus. Since the mean and variance
are positively related at low values of N (i.e., K =>0 if N < 5),
the induced reduction in mean fertility represents the adjustment to
the variance associated with N*. This is indicated by curve B in Figure
2.18 By subtracting an amount proportional to N from curve A, curve
B peaks at a level of N below N8.
So far, we have shown that imperfect fertility control implies that
a couple's actual fertility N is a stochastic variable. The couple, by
its choice of a contraceptive strategy, acquires some distribution of
expected fertility outcomes, and by the nature of the biological process
18As N increases along curve A, cry2 rises by K per unit of N (up to N =5),thus an
amount of V proportional to N, N,is subtracted from curve A yielding curve B.
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mumof V gives the desired value of fertility, N8, it follows from equa-
tion 7 that
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required to implement that strategy. Some strategies cost money, some
cost sexual satisfaction, some cost real or imagined decreases in phys-
ical health. The assumption of utility maximizing behavior implies
that couples will choose the least costly strategy they are aware of in
order to achieve any given level of p which yieldsand its associated
tTN.Supposethe couple's cost schedule for achieving any given Pt or
its fertility outcome IS
F =
Fis the total cost of achieving using the least costly con-
traceptive strategy. More specifically, let the cost of the ith contracep-
tive strategy be the simple linear function
F, =a1+ f34Ba1+ —P'N) (13)
where B is the difference between the couple's natural fertility,
andthe mean of the distribution of its expected fertility while using
strategy i. Thus, B is the expected number of births averted.
Equation 13 implies that the total cost of contraception using the
ith technique may be divided into two components: (1) a fixed cost
a1, (a10), which must be incurred if the ith technique is to be used
at all, and (2) a variable cost /31B,whichis proportional to the number
of births averted by the use of technique i.21 The term 0),
is the marginal cost per birth averted.22
It is important to stress that the classification of the contraception
costs F1 of a given technique as fixed (a1) or variable (f3B)isdistinct
from the classification of costs by their source. An economic
money or time), sociological (e.g., teachings of the Catholic church,
deviation from class norms), psychological (e.g., interference with
sexual pleasure, fear of adverse effects on health) or physiological
(e.g., health) cost may be either fixed or variable.
Some factors, however, are more likely to affect a thanor vice
versa. Lack of contraceptive knowledge, for instance, is often cited as
a.reason for imperfect control. To the extent that this is true, it is
sensible to suppose that the acquisition of information about fertility
21 Each contraceptive strategy involves boththeadoption of a contraceptive technique
and the care and precision in its use. The adoption of technique iandits careless use
results in less efficient contraception, a lower e1,higherPtandfewer births averted.
Nearly all contraceptive techniques are capable of achieving a low e1withcareless use or
a high e. with proficient use.
22 linearity of the cost functions in equation 13 is not a particularly crucial as-
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control methods is costly. A characteristic of the cost of information
is that it does not depend on the amount of use to which the information
is put. It follows that the costs of information tend to influence the fixed
costs of contraception (the at's), but not the marginal costs (the f3,'s).23
The cost to a Catholic of violating the church's precepts with respect
to the use of a contraceptive, for example, might be a once-and-for-all
cost, in which case a, is higher for Catholics than non-Catholics for
all forbidden contraceptive techniques. Alternatively (or a.ditionally),
a Catholic may experience greater guilt the more intensively the tech-
nique is used, in which caseis higher to Catholics than to non-Catho-
lics.24
The loss of sexual pleasure occasioned by contraception almost
surely affects only the marginal costs of contraception and not the
fixed costs. Thus, the number of births averted by condoms depends
on how frequently and with what care condoms are used. The most
ancient contraceptive techniques —abstinenceor reduced coital fre-
quency, and withdrawal—probably have zero fixed cost and rather
high (psychological) marginal costs. By way of example, consider the
choice between reduced coital frequency or withdrawal as alterna-
tive contraceptive techniques. If a husband and wife use neither
technique at all, they will expect to havebirthsand they will avert
no births (i.e., B= 0).The more persistently either technique is used,
the smaller will be the expected fertility, the larger the expected
number of births averted, and the larger the total contraception costs.
Which technique is least costly depends solely on which technique has
the lower marginal cost. If the marginal cost of reduced coitaJ fre-
quency exceeds the marginal cost of withdrawal, for example, the
couple would not use the former technique whatever its desired
number of averted births (note that we are limiting the choice at this
point to pure strategies).
23This argument should be qualified to the extent that information is acquired by a
process of "learning by doing" or that information deteriorates with disuse by a process
of forgetting. In this case, the marginal cost of the ith techniquewouldtend to shift
downward as the volume of use increases. Analytically, the learning hypothesis and the
once-and-for-all hypothesis have the same implication, namely, that the average con-
traception cost per birth averted decreases as Bincreases.
24 costto an individual Catholic of violating the church's precepts may also be a
function of the behavior of other Catholics or of other members of the society at large.
Thus, the dynamics of diffusion of the pill use among Catholics might be interpreted,
in part, as the progressive lowering in the cost of contraception to each individual
Catholic as he or she sees others using the pill. Of course, the equivocation within the
church itself also presumably lowers the costs of using forbidden techniques (see Ryder
and Westoff 1971, Chapter 8, for evidence on the effect of the Papal Encyclical on the
contraceptive behavior of Catholics).FIGURE 3
Hypothetical Fertility Control Cost Functions for
Various Contraceptive Techniques
I I I
65 432 10ii.,,, Expected fertility
Itis not always the case that one technique dominates all others
for all possible fertility goals. Suppose, for example, that a third tech-
nique, condoms (i =3),has a lower marginal cost than does withdrawal
(i =2)(i.e.,</32),butthat it has a positive fixed cost (i.e., a3> a2
= 0).This situation is depicted in Figure 3, where line OF2 indicates
the total contraception cost incurred if withdrawal is used to achieve
each possible value of expected births averted (reading the upper
horizontal scale from left to right) or, equivalently, at each possible
level of expected fertility (reading the lower horizontal scale from right
to left). Similarly, line a3F3 shows the cost of using condoms to achieve
each possible outcome. -
Toavert fewer than seven births (i.e., to have five or more children),
the least cost strategy in Figure 3 is withdrawal. However, to avert
more than seven births, condoms are a less costly contraceptive
method. The point of equal costs (where lines OF2 and a3F3 intersect)
is called the "switching point": as the number of births to be averted
rises, at some point (e.g., seven in the example illustrated in the
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ment in an alternative technique —toswitch to the technique with the
lower marginal cost.
Additional contraceptive techniques with still higher fixed costs and
lower marginal costs may have lower average cost at higher numbers
of averted births. The total cost function F (equation 12) is defined
as the collection of line segments which represent the least-cost method
of achieving each number of averted births. It is the envelope of seg-
ments of thecurves in Figure 3. The limiting case would be a con-
traceptive with zero cost (i.e., method i =4in the figure).
A relatively low marginal cost appears to be a major advantage of
modern contraceptive methods such as the pill and IUD. If line a4F4
represents such a technique in Figure 3, note that it represents the
optimal contraceptive choice only if the couple wishes to have fewer
than one child (as the figure happens to be drawn). That is, only couples
wishing to avert nearly all potential births would select that high
fixed cost, zero marginal cost technique.
D. Optimal Fertility Contrbl Strategy
The preceding sections have discussed the separate elements in the
determination of an optimal fertility control strategy. Using the
simplifying assumption that a household must follow a pure strategy
(i.e., must choose a constant value of p for the entire reproductive
span), we derived a biological constraint on fertility choices illustrated
by the mean-variance curve in Figure 1.
Next, we derived the expected utility of the household as a function
of the mean and variance of fertility outcomes. This relationship is
depicted in Figure 2. The fertility level with the highest net value N*
under conditions of certainty (i.e., 0N2 =0)and costless contracep-
tion is defined as the couple's "desired fertility." If, however, the
couple is constrained to choose points on the mean-variance curve in
Figure 1 (but may choose any point without incurring any fertility
control cost), the decrease in uncertainty associated with decreases in
expected fertility makes it optimal to choose a level of expected fer-
tilitythat is somewhat lower than its desired fertility, N*.
Finally, we introduced the (utility) costs of controlling fertility by
means of specific contraceptive techniques. We derived a fertility
control cost function as the envelope of least-cost segments of the cost
curves of the individual techniques, which is shown in Figure 3. Hold-
ing the couple's expected natural fertility, constant, its total cost
of fertility control F is larger, the smaller the level of its expected
fertility
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The selection of the couple's optimal fertility control strategy in-
volves two steps. First, for any given choice ofand,jointly, the
couple selects the least costly contraception technique —saythe ith
technique—with total cost F, =+ — Second,it selects a
level of ,aN (and 0N2)suchthat total expected utility (i.e., the expected
net utility from children E(V), minus the total cost F,) is maximized.
That is, using the specific functional forms in equations 9 and 13
max {E(V)— Fj=max{a ++ + —a,
(14)
The necessary condition-for maximization with respect to is
(15)
Solving forand again approximating qi'(seeequation 10) by the
constant K > 0
(16)
where k = 0.
Equation 16 summarizes the influence on fertility outcomes of im-
perfect and costly fertility control. If the couple could select any level
of fertility costlessly and with certainty, it would select N*, its "de-
sired fertility" determined by its tastes, economic circumstances, and
so forth. Since fertility outcomes involve an element of uncertainty
(i.e., result from a stochastic process), there is a variance associated
with each level of fertility, and since this uncertainty lowers the ex-
pected benefits or utility from each level of N, this uncertainty induces
the couple to prefer an expected level of fertility lowerthan N*
=N*— Kf2). Furthermore, since it is costly to avert births, the
costs of fertility control further modify the optimal fertility outcome,
raising the optimal above the level =±3k).In effect, /3-
is a per unit subsidy to childbearing, because a couple may reduce its
contraceptive cost by /3,withevery additional birth it has.
The relationship between these various levels of fertility can be
indicated by combining Figures 2 and 3 (see Figure 4). Utility would
be maximized at a level of N =N*if the costs of fertility control
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Hypothetical Fertility Control Cost and Benefit Functions
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•(e.g.,the maximum of the net benefit function A is at a level of N =
N*).The presence of uncertainty modifies the optimum by raising the
peak of the net benefit function (function B) to the level N =The
presence of fertility control costs further modifies the optimum by
lowering the preferred N to theintersection of the marginal cost
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In the previous section, we restricted the discussion of contraceptive
strategies to a "pure" strategy, defined as one in which the couple
selects some specific contraceptive technique and uses it with some
specific amount of care throughout the reproductive span of T months.
The pure strategy model, in which the couple uses one technique con-
tinuously, implies a constant monthly probability of conception p over
the fertile months in the reproductive span. This implication is essen-
tial for the Markov renewal process on which are based the equations
for the mean and variance of fertility outcomes (equations 1 and 2)
and the mean-variance curves depicted in Figure 1. So the pure strategy
model lends itself to a simple analytical structure and represents a
boundary on the relationship between mean and variance of fertility.
As we have noted, this Markov renewal model also underlies much
ofimportant analytical work done in the past decade in mathe-
matical demography.
However, it is evident that, in reality, a couple is not restricted from
altering its contraceptive technique over the reproductive span. Even
in the context of a lifetime strategy which could be mapped out initially
and carried out over time, a couple might choose to use different con-
traceptive techniques (including no contraception) in various segments
of that span of time. Furthermore, since the discussion of the benefits
of fertility control emphasized that under fairly conditions
couples prefer to reduce the yariance in their expected fertility, it
is economically sensible as well as technically feasible for couples to
select a mixed contraceptive strategy which may result in a lower
0N for any level of expected fertility uN.
Forexample, if a couple used the oral contraceptive at its average
observed use-effectiveness throughout its twenty-year reproductive
span, Table 2 indicates that the distribution of its expected fertility
Theeconomic rationale, offered in Section II, for preferring a reduced variance in
fertility was that any deviation in actual fertility from the desired level of fertility im-
plies a reduction in utility. The greater the;variancethe greater the likelihood that
the discrepancy between actual and desired fertility will be relatively large.
There is an additional economic reason for generally preferring a lower variance in
the distribution of expected outcomes, risk preference aside. The more certain the
couple is about the number of children it will eventually have, the more efficiently it
can optimize the allocation of its resources. The couple which is more certain about the
timing and number of its children can more efficiently plan its savings pattern, select
an optimal size home, automobile, et cetera, plan the labor force behavior of the wife,
and so forth. The same principles apply here as in the case of a firm which can achieve
lower average cost of production if its rate of output is constant over the long run than
if its rate of output varies significantly from season to season or from year to year.52 Demographic Behavior of the Household
has a mean of 0.19 births and a variance of 0.18 (point a on the mean-
variance curve in Figure 1). If this couple wished to have about three .
children,it could use a less effective technique or use the pill some-
what carelessly, thereby achieving a monthly probability of concep- '. ..
tionof 0.0182 which over a twenty-year span would yield an expected
fertility of 3.4 and a variance of 1.99 (point c on the mean-variance
curvein Figure 1). The couple could also achieve a mean fertility of
S
3.4,however, by combining periods of pill use with periods of time in..
whichno contraception was used. The result would be a mean of 3.4 . .
childrenand a variance considerably below that indicated by point c .
onthe mean-variance curve. Indeed the variance would be no greater .. '. .
thanthat indicated by point f, the variance associated with the use of . .
.:.
no contraception over the entire twenty-year time span.26 :..
Furthermorethe pure strategy implies that the births will amve at
random intervals over the twenty-year span, while the mixed strategy . -. . .
permitsthe couple to achieve the same number of children with con- •:.
siderablecontrol over their spacing 27 By combining the use of a highly
effective technique with periods of no contraception, a couple can
.
achieveits desired number of children with a relatively low variance .. .
S.
and relatively little uncertainty about the spacing of its children
The mean-variance curve in Figure1represents the biological . . .
constrainton the distribution of expected fertility when a particular
monthly birth probability persists for the entire span of T months. By .:
..
usinga mixed strategy, combining contraception with penods of no
contraception the biological constraint is no longer an effective con-
straint —the couple can move off the mean-vanance curve toward the
horizontal axis representing a distribution of fertility outcomes of
meanand zero variance The more efficient the contraceptive tech-
26 logicalextreme would be a mixed strategy in which natural fertiiity (no con- . ., . . .S..
traception)is pursued in those segments of the reproductive span in which a birth is .: ...
desiredand perfect contraception (i.e., e,= 0)at all other times. This strategy would
..
.... .
enablea normally fecund couple to achieve any given number of children fewer than
say, five with virtual certainty and would also enable them to approximate many plausi- :.
bledesired spacing patterns fairly closeiy (see Potter and Sakoda 1967). . .•
S
Sucha strategy is not possibility, but it is also technically feasible, since ... .:
themonthly probability may be set to zero at any time by reducing coital frequency to
zero. The fact that couples do not appear to follow this "perfect contraception" strategy ... . T . .
.
suggeststhat the problem of fertility control is not a matter of technical feasibility. The
.. S
S
biologicalconstraint on fertility choices must be considered simultaneously with other
constraints on behavior with fertility goals viewed as competing with other family
goals
27Inthe pure strategy case the variance of the interval of time between successive . . . ...• S
birthsu-,2is inversely related to p and henceThus reduction in expected fertility
along the mean vanance curve is accompanied by an increaseinvanance u-,228 evidence that the correlation between mean and variance of fertility is posi-
tive is found in the 1960 U.S. Census of the Population. Grouping white women married
once and husband present into cells defined by husband's occupation (8 categories),
husband's education (5categories)and wife's education (3 categories), the unweighted
simple correlation between and across cells is 0.89 for women aged 45—54and
0.77 for women aged 35—44.Ifthe younger cohort used better contraceptive methods
on the average, then the reduction in this correlation across cohorts is consistent with
the implication of a weaker correlation among users of better contraception.
29 Michael (1973), Table 4. One note of caution. The NFS data are oriented by
the woman's pregnancy intervals, so Michael had information on only the best tech-
nique used by the woman in each interval. He could therefore identify switches in con-
traceptive techniques from pregnancy interval to interval, but not from technique
to technique within a given pregnancy interval.
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nique chosen during periods of contraception, the smaller is the
achievable variancefor any given meanThus the more efficient
the contraceptive technique chosen, the weaker is the relationship
betweenand and the smaller is the incentive to lower the
mean fertility as a mechanism for reducing uncertainty or variance.
The mixed strategy (defined in terms of using one specific technique
while contracepting and no àontraception otherwise) is feasible only
when the expected number of births from the continuous use of the
technique is less than the number of children the couple desires. So
this form of mixed strategy is more likely to be used the greater is
the efficiency of the contraceptive technique chosen.
In this discussion of mixed strategies of contraception, we have
focused upon one particular type of mixed strategy —thatof adopting
and abandoning at intervals one contraceptive technique. Although
shifting from contraceptive technique to technique is another pos-
sibility, the theoretical discussion of the costs of contraception sug-
gested that this would not be the case. The fixed costs associated with
the adoption of modern techniques would inhibit technique switching.
Consistent with the model's implication, evidence from the 1965
National Fertility Survey (NFS) suggests that technique switching has
not been a prevalent practice in the United States in the past two
decades. Ranking contraceptive methods by their mean monthly
probability of conception (as indicated in Table 2) and limiting the
subsample to women who had used some contraception in each of
their first three birth intervals, Michael (1973) found that the correla-
tion among techniques used across the three pregnancy intervals was
quite high (ranging from 0.57 to 0.97) for non-Catholic women parti-
tioned by color and age cohort.29 Ryder and Westoff (1971) study the
relationship between use and nonuse of contraception across intervals
and the relationship between contraceptive failures in successive
intervals. They find considerable continuity of contraceptive status
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across intervals both in terms of whether a woman does or does not
use contraception in successive intervals and in terms of the degree
of success of use across intervals.30
IV. CONTRACEPTION AND FERTILITY OUTCOMES
In the model described in Section II, the household's number of
children N is a random variable. The household adopts a contracep-
tive strategy which yields a particular value of p, the monthly prob-
ability of conception. Given p as a known and fixed parameter, the
household has an ex ante distribution of fertility characterized by a
meanand variance
The discussion has focused on the ex ante distribution of fertility
outcomes for a single household, but in our empirical analysis we
focus on the corresponding distribution for relatively homogeneous
groups of households. It is assumed that the observed mean and
variance in births among households with relatively homogeneous
demographic-economic characteristics reflect the mean and variance
of the distribution of fertility outcomes faced by each of the house-
holds in that group. Recall that the equation for the variance in number
of children (equation 2) assumed that the unprotected monthly pro-
bability of conception and the length of the period of infertility were
constant over the couple's reproductive lifetime. To apply the model
across households implies not only constancy of these parameters
over time for a given household, but also constancy across households.
Heckman and Willis deal explicitly with the problem of estimating the
3°Forexample, 90 per cent of women who used some contraceptive technique in the
first pregnancy interval (from marriage to first pregnancy) used a contraceptive in the
second interval, while only 36 per cent of nonusers in the first interval used a contracep-
tive in the second interval. Similar percentages are found for each successive pair of
intervals (i.e., from the fourth to the fifth interval the comparable percentages are 95 per
cent and 18 per cent). See Ryder and Westoff (1971), Table IX-19, p. 255.Or,95 per
cent of the women who had used contraception in each of the first three pregnancy
intervals used contraception in the fourth interval, while only 13 per cent of women
who had not used contraception in any of the first three intervals used contraception in
the fourth (see Ryder and Westoff (1971), Table IX-23, p. 260).
Evidence of consistency of use across intervals is indicated by the following rather
remarkable statistic: of women who used a contraceptive "successfully" in the first
three pregnancy intervals, 20 per cent experienced a contraceptive "failure" in the
fourth pregnancy interval, while of those who had experienced a contraceptive "failure"
in each of the first three intervals, 77 per cent experienced a "failure" again in their
fourth interval (see Ryder and Westoff for definitions of success and failure).
This statistic and others support quite strongly, we think, the contention that couples
act as if they adopt a lifetime strategy toward contraception and that that strategy in-
volves considerable continuity in the use of a technique throughout a lifetime. (The
Princeton Study begun in 1957 also suggested that across-interval changes in fertility
control are "clearly not a matter of couples shifting from ineffective to effective methods"
of contraception. See Westoff, Potter, and Sagi 1963 (pp. 232—235).)Contraception and Fertility 55
average monthly probability p in heterogeneous groups of households.
For our purposes, we will not pursue this issue.31
The model in Section II was set out in a lifetime context and con-
sidered fertility control in terms of a lifetime strategy. Accordingly,
in our empirical work we frequently use information about contracep-
tive behavior at one point in the couple's marriage as an indication,
or index, of the lifetime contraceptive strategy. As we indicated in
Section III, there is considerable evidence that contraceptive behavior
is not characterized by switching from contraceptive technique to
technique over the life span. Consequently, in this section we will
distinguish couples either by the best contraceptive technique used in
the time interval from marriage to their first pregnancy or by the best
technique used at any time in their marriage.32
Considertwo populations of fecund, nonpregnant women with identical mean
monthly probabilities of conception,Onepopulation is homogeneous in the sense
that p is identical for all members of the population, and the other is heterogeneous in
the sense that p varies across women according to some distribution with positive
variance. It is known that the mean waiting time to conception in the heterogeneous
population will be longer and the average birthrate lower than in the homogeneous popu-
lation, and that this difference is a function of the distribution of p in the heterogeneous
population (see, for example, Sheps, 1964).
32Inaddition to the evidence cited above regarding consistency of technique use
between pregnancy intervals, the following table indicates the percentage of users of a
specific contraceptive technique in the first interval who also used that technique in the
second interval. The second column indicates the percentage who used either that same
technique or no contraception in the second interval. These figures pertain to white
non-Catholic women aged 40—44 from the 1965 NFS.
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Jelly, foam, 61 67
Rhythm 65 85
Douche 62 73
The table indicates, for example, that of those couples which used the diaphragm in
the first pregnancy interval, 77 per cent also used the diaphragm in the second preg-
nancy interval. Furthermore, of that same group another 12 per cent used no contra-
ception in the second pregnancy interval; thus, a total of 89 per cent used either that
same contraceptive method or no method in the second interval. (The second interval
here is defined as either the period of time from the first to the second pregnancy or from
the first pregnancy to the time of the survey if no second pregnancy occurred.)
Since these data were collected by interview at the time these women were 40—44
years of age and pertain to periods of time shortly after marriage, there may be a tend-
ency to give the same response for successive intervals. If so, these percentages over-
state the consistency of technique selection across intervals.56 Demographic Behavior of the Household
In this and the.following section, we use the 1965 National Fertility
Survey, which was conducted by the Office of Population Research
at Princeton This cross-section survey of some 5,600
women aged 55 and under, currently married and living with their
spouse, contains information on the specific contraceptive technique
used in each pregnancy interval, as well as information on the couple's
actual fertility outcome. In this section, we use this data set to docu-
ment the relationship between contraception use and fertility out-
comes. Since we are interested in studying the variance in fertility,
we group the data into cells and study between-cell differences in
observed behavior.
In this section we explore how contraception behavior is related to
the observed distribution of fertility across groups of households; we
do not attempt to explain why couples differ in their desired fertility
or in the dispersion of their fertility. Although we indicated in Section
11 that the model is capable of treating contraception choice and fer-
tility control choice in a simultaneous system of equations, we do not
attempt to estimate the parameters of those structural equations. In
the tables below, we partition the data set by household character-
istics including color and religion, and we use either the wife's educa-
tion or expected fertility and either age of wife or marriage duration
to isolate relatively homogeneous groups of households. In the con-
text of these homogeneous groups, we study contraception strategies
as the mechanism for affecting fertility outcomes.
Figure 5 indicates the frequency distribution of live births for wo-
men aged 3 5—55 for groups defined by wife's level of schooling, color,
and religion. Among the white non-Catholics (Figure 5(A)) the distri-
butions appear to be less positively skewed and less dispersed (or more
peaked) among women with higher levels of schooling.34 By contrast,
We wish to thank Charles F. Westoff and Norman B. Ryder for their help in ob-
taining these data. Our previously published research from this data set (Michael 1973)
used a small data file obtained from Professor Westoff. Our current research uses the
publicly available data tape from the 1965 was acquired through Larry
Bunipass. The data set is fully described in Ryder and Westoff, Reproductioninthe
United Slates 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
A few chi-squared tests have been performed on pairs of distributions of live births
for groups of white non-Catholics with different education levels from specific 5-year
cohorts. These tests imply rejection (at a =.05)of the hypothesis that the grade-school
women's distribution of live births and the college women's distribution of live births
might have been drawn from the same population.
For example, x2 =36.8with 12 degrees of freedom for a comparison of8 years
versus13 years of schooling for women aged 40—44. The critical value forwith
12 degrees of freedom at a.01 is 26.2.
F .-F.











































































































































































































































































































)58 Demographic Behavior of the Household
the distributions for nonwhite non-Catholics (Figure 5(B)) are con-
siderably less peaked and more skewed. Among this latter group, the
level of schooling does not distinguish the frequency distributions
so clearly, although the percentage of households with, say, seven or
more births appears to decline as the level of schooling rises. Among
Catholics (Figure 5(C)) the distributions are somewhat less dispersed
than among the nonwhite non-Catholics, and the level of schooling
does not appear to influence the distributions systematically.
Among white non-Catholics, there appear to be distinctly different
distributions of live births by wife's education. These differences are
further emphasized by the following table derived from Appendix
Table A. 1. Also, the groups of nonwhites and Catholics appear from
Percentage of Women with Six or More Live Births:
White Non-Catholic Women




35—39 40—44 45—49 50—54
8 22.7 22.4 23.4 19.6
9—11 11.5 15.6 5.7 13.1
12 6.8 6.7 4.8 1.3
13 2.7 1.6 1.6 2.2 .
Total 8.8 10.1 7.9 8.7
Figure 5 to have considerably different frequency distributions than
the most highly schooled white non-Catholic groups. The discussion
above has suggested that different contraceptive strategies yield
different distributions of fertility, so we expect to find that groups
which differ in the distribution of their actual fertility also differ in their
contraception behavior. The NFS data contain information on the
particular contraceptive method used by each woman in each preg-
nancy interval. The data do not indicate how extensively, regularly,
or carefullya contraceptive method was used; we know only that the
woman indicated that between the time she married and the time she
first became pregnant, for example, she used contraceptive method i
(including no method at all).
Figure 6 indicates the percentage of women in each education, color,—..•
• . .




Percentage Ever Using "Good" Contraception by Wife's Education
for Groups by Color and Religion, Women Aged 35—55
Per cent
9-11 12
Years of wife's education
and religion group which ever used a "good"contraceptive tech-
nique. The relationship between these percentages and the distribu-
tions of births indicated in Figure 5isstriking. Among white non-
Catholics, the percentage of users of "good" contraceptive tech-
niques rises significantly with the wife's level of schooling, and this is
also the group for which schooling most clearly distinguishes the dis-
this section, "good" contraception is defined to include pill, IUD,
condom, and diaphragm. For older cohorts, the best available contraceptive methods
were the condom and diaphragm, while for the younger cohorts the more reliable pill
and IUD were also available. Since we are attempting at this time to distinguish use of
highly reliable from less reliable techniques, the distinction was arbitrarily made as
indicated. All contraceptive methods other than the pill, IUD, condom and diaphragm
are categorized as "poor" methods. The use of no contraception is called "none" and is
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tributions of births. The percentages rise less rapidly by education
among the nonwhites, and for these groups the frequency distribu-
tions of births are less clearly delineated by education. Among Cath-
olics, neither the percentage of users of good contraceptive techniques
nor the frequency distribution of births seems to be closely related
to wife's education. Thus, in comparisons among and within color
and religion groups, there appears to be a quite consistent relation-
ship: groups characterized by a relatively high percentage of users
of good contraception are also characterized by relatively low dis-
persion in fertility.
Table 3 summarizes this same relationship. The table indicates,
for each education, color, and religion group, the percentage of
couples ever using "good" contraception and the actual mean and
standard deviation of live births. Groups characterized by a high per-
centage of users of good contraception are characterized by relatively
lower variance and somewhat lower mean fertility. Simple correlations
across these groups between the percentage of couples which ever
used good contraception (at any time since marriage), "% good," and
the mean fertilityand between "% good" and the standard devia-
tionare consistently negative. As emphasized in the theoretical
discussion of the mean-variance curve, the observed correlation be-
tween the mean and variance (or standard deviation) in fertility is
positive in all cases:
Simple Correlation Coefficients between % Good (the Percentage of
Couples Which Ever Used Good Contraception), /.LN (the Group's
Mean Number of Live Births), and(theStandard Deviation in
























The relationship between contraception behavior and fertility out-


































































































Contraception and Fertility 61
TABLE3
Percentage of Couples Using "Good" Contraception,
Mean and Standard Deviation of Live Births; by Wife's
Education, Age, Color, and Religion
a Percentageof couples in the cell which ever used "good" contraception (i.e., pill,
IUD, condom, or diaphragm).
bn indicatescell size. These figures are in parentheses.62 DemographicBehavior of the Household
households which had relatively high rates of use of good contracep-
tion also had relatively low mean and low variance in fertility. To re-
late contraception use to fertility outcomes more directly we partition
the age, education groups of white non-Catholics by their contracep-
tive strategies. Table 4, for example, indicates the separate frequency
distribution of live births for users of good contraception and users
of. poor contraception in the first pregnancy interval by wife's age for
women with 12 years of schooling. That is, in Table 4 two of the cells
in Table 3 (defined by wife's education equal to 12 years for women
aged 3 5—44 and aged 45—54) are partitioned by the contraceptive
technique used in the first birth interval.
For each of the two age groups the distribution of live births is con-
siderably less dispersed among the users of good contraception than
among users of poor contraception (e.g., the percentage of households
with five or more live births was 10.3 and 3.0 among users of good
contraception, while the percentages were 14.9 and 15.4 among users
TABLE 4
Frequency Distribution of Live Births for White
Non-Catholic Women with 12 Years of Education by
Contraceptive Method Used in the First Pregnancy Interval





Size 0 1 2—4 5—6 a7
Age 35—44
Good a 1.4 7.0 81.2 8.9 1.4 (213)
Poor 2.0 13.9 69.3 11.9 3.0 (101)
None 15.3 14.8 55.6 11.1 3.2 (189)
Total 6.8 11.3 69.2 10.3 2.4 (503)
Age 45—54
Good a 0.0 16.7 80.3 3.0 0.0 (66)
Poor 0.0 12.8 71.8 7.7 7.7 (39)
None 31.7 20.8 41.6 5.0 1.0 (101)
Total 15.5 18.0 59.7 4.9 1.9 (206)
a "Good" methods are defined to be pill, IUD, condom, and diaphragm; "poor"
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ofpoor contraception). Notice, too, the large percentage of nonusers
in the first interval which had zero live births. Presumably a relatively
large fraction of the users of no contraception knew themselves to be
sterile or subfecund. In the terminology of the model developed in
Section II, couples with a relatively low natural fecundity and a low
expected fertility need avert fewer births to achieve any given level
of desired fertility. Consequently, these couples have less incentive
to use any contraception, in general, and less incentive to adopt high-
fixed-cost techniques, in particular.
Table 5alsoindicates the relationship between contraception use
and fertility outcomes. While Table 4 shows a frequency distribution
of live births by contraception use for two of the cells of white non-
Catholic women from Table 3, Table 5indicatesthe mean and standard
deviation of the live births by contraception use for each of the 5cells
of white non-Catholic women aged 3 5—44fromTable 3.
Compare the fertility behavior of the "good" and "poor" contra-
ceptors for some given level of schooling in Table 5.Interms of mean
fertility, couples which used a "good" contraceptive method (pill,
IUD, condom, or diaphragm) in the first birth interval had somewhat
lower mean fertility than couples which used relatively "poor" con-
traceptive methods. As panel B indicates, however, very few of the
differences in means are statistically significant. By contrast, the
comparison of differences in the standard deviation of the fertility
outcomes does exhibit statistical significance: the users of poor con-
traception have appreciably higher variation in their fertility outcomes
than do users of good contraception.36
The lack of a stronger association between contraception use and
mean fertility in Table 5issomewhat surprising. However, recall
that equation 16 emphasized two opposing forces influencing optimal
mean fertility. The marginal costs of fertility control raised optimal
mean fertility althoughthe positive relationship between the
mean and variance lowered optimal fertility (—K/2) as a mechanism
for reducing the uncertainty about the number of births. We showed
that couples wishing to avert more births would be induced to adopt
better(higher-fixed-cost,lower-marginal-cost) contraceptive tech-
niques. We also suggested that users of better techniques are more
likely to use a mixed strategy of contraception, which implies a weaker
relationship between the mean and variance of fertility. So users of
Note that in the tests of significance of the variances, the few pair-wise comparisons
which were not significant involved the relatively small cells containing 40 or fewer
observations.
Contraception and Fertility
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TABLE 5
Mean Number of Live Birthsand Standard Deviation of
Number of Live BirthsforWhite Non-Catholic Women
by Wife's Education and by the Contraceptive Method
(Good, Poor, None) Used in the First Birth Interval, for
Women Aged 3 5—44
A.
Contraceptive Method Education of Wife
Used in First Birth
Interval 9—11 12 Total
Good 3.769 3.069: 2.784 2.887 2.920
2.065 1.476 1.274 1.076 1.334
(26) (72) (213) (124) (435)
Poor 3.840 3.800 2.941 2.706 3.185
a-s. 2.444 2.028 1.515 1.488 1.802
(n) (25) (40) (101) (34) (200)
None 3.587 3.242 2.577 2.000 2.872
2.817 2.134 1.860 1.854 2.224
(n) (104) (120) (189) (72) (485)
Total 3.658 3.284 2.738 2.583 2.946
2.635 1.942 1.567 1.472 1.849
(n) (155) (232) (503) (230) (1,120)
B.
Tests of Statistical Significance of Differences in Means and Variances
in Number of Live Births, for Specific Pairs of Cells
Education of Wife
Difference by
Contraceptive Method 9W-Il 12
Test of Difference in Means (Student's tTest)
Good vs. poor 0.11 2.03 0.91 0.67
Poor vs. none 0.45 1.47 1.82 b 2.08 c
Good vs. none 0.37 0.64 1.20
Tests of Difference in Variance (F Test)
Good vs. poor 1.40 1.88c l..42c
Poor vs. none 1.33 1.11 1.50c 1.56




a n indicates cell size. These figures are in parentheses.
1)Impliesstatistical difference at a =.10(two-tailedtest).
Implies statistical difference at a =.05(two-tailed (test).




Test of Differences in Mean and Variance of Number of Live Births by
Wife's Education for Users of Good Contraception Only
Difference in
Difference by Means Variance
Wife's Education ((Test) (F Test)
vs. 9—li 1.59 1.95 c
vs. 12 2.35 C 2.63 d
• 2.12C
9—11 vs.12 1.46 1.34C
9—11 vs. 0.92 1.88d
12 vs. 0.78 1.40 c
good contraception are expected to have lower marginal costs of
fertility control (a lowerand also a weaker relationship between
mean and variance (a lower K).Consequently,if wife's education
sorts couples by their desired fertility in Table 5,thefurther parti-
tioning by good or poor contraception may not have a systematic
effect on mean fertility. The users of good contraception have lower
marginal cost of averting births, but less incentive to reduce mean
fertility as a mechanism for lowering the uncertainty or variance of
fertility. As the relationships in Tables 3 through 5 indicate, across
relatively homogeneous groups there is a negative relationship between
the use of good contraception and mean fertility, but within the
homogeneous groups, the use of good contraception systematically
affects only the variance of fertility outcomes. Couples wishing to
avert relatively more births have greater incentives to use good con-
traception, and within a group homogeneous with respect to their
desired fertility, those who use good contraception achieve a lower
variance of fertility.
Table 5 also indicates that there is a tendency for the more educated
women to have lower mean fertility and smaller variance of fertility
for each contraception category. The differences in the means do not
often exhibit statistical significance (see panel B), but the differences
in the variances among users of good contraception are statistically66 Demo graphic Behavior of the Household
significant, often at a =.01.The observed relationships between
and acrosseducation groups for good and for poor contraception
users separately, mirror the observed relationship between and cTN
across good and poor contraception users, holding education constant.
This observation is quite consistent with more educated couples
being more proficient users of each given contraceptive method —the
partitioning of the sample of women aged 35—44 by "good" and "poor"
(holding education constant) yields the same qualitative differences
as the partitioning by more and less education (holding contraception
quality constant).
To obtain another measure of the relationships among contraception
choice, the wife's education, and' fertility outcomes as indicated in
Table 5 a multiple regression was run using the twelve education—
contraception method cells. Let N, and V3 be the mean and standard
deviation of live births in cell j, G3 and P3 be dummy variables re-
flecting the use of good contraception (compared to poor) and poor
contraception (compared to none), and E, be the wife's education level
(assigned the values 7, 10, 12, and '14 for the respective columns).
The regressions, weighted by the square root of the cell sizes, yielded:
and




(Figures in parentheses are t ratios.)
The wife's education has a significant negative effect on both the
mean and the standard deviation of the number of live births. Con-
traception use had no significant effect on the mean number of live
births, but users of poor contraception had a significantly lower standard
deviation in live births than users of no contraception, and users of
good contraception had a significantly lower standard deviation in
live births than users of poor contraception.
Table 6 partitions this set of households, the white non-Catholics,
by duration of marriage and the expected number of children, for
women married only once and aged 35 and above. Since age at mar-
riage differs systematically by several socioeconomic characteristics,
,7 standarddeviations of N3 and V3 were 0.559 and 0.517 and the standard errors
of the estimates were 0.359 and 0.127 respectively.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.68 Demographic Behavior of the Household
the partitioning by marriage duration should more adequately stand-
ardize for the length of the period of time at risk of conception. To
standardize further for the incentives to avert births, we have used a
definition of expected number of children derived by regressing the.
actual number of live births on a set of economic and demographic
characteristics.38 We used this fertility demand function to estimate
N for each household, then grouped households into cells defined by
intervals of /739
Oneobserves in Table 6 that when the marriage duration and the
household's expected fertilityare held constant, users of good con-
traception had smaller variation in their actual fertility than did users
of poor or no contraception. Also, standardized for marriage duration
and contraception choice, households characterized by N equal to
three tended to experience a larger variation in actual fertility than
households characterized by N equal to two. That is, there appears
to be a positive association between mean fertility and the standard
deviation of fertility. Furthermore, as Figure 7 indicates, the positive
relationship between N and (TNappearsto be strongest among users of
no contraception.4°
Since more educated women tend to marry at later ages, the total
length of time at risk of conception probably differs by education for
women of a given age. Table 5 partitions the sample by wife's age and
education; for comparison Table 7 partitions the sample by wife's
education and marriage duration for women married once and aged 35
and above. Although the cell sizes in Table 7 are smaller and the re-
sults somewhat more erratic, one again observes a tendency for users
of good contraception to have somewhat lower mean fertility and,











a Theregression was estimated from the 1965 NFS for white non-Catholic women
aged 35 or above. The estimation yielded: N =10.09616—0.35473(MARl) —0.00042
(I) —0.34462(ED)+0.00003(EDXI) + 0.30078(URB) + 0.09881(MARD) —
0.12119 (AGE),whereMARl equals 1 if married more than once or equals zero other-
wise; I is an estimate of the husband's income at age 40 based on an estimated earnings
function using husband's education and market experience; ED is the wife's education
level; EDXI is a multiplicative interaction term using ED and I; URB equals 1 if the
household lives in a rural area or equals zero otherwise; MARD is the duration of the
current marriage in years; and AGE is the wife's age.
aThisprocedure partitions the group of households into cells on the basis of the
economic and demographic characteristics which, on average, are associated with one,
two, three, or four children. For our purposes this procedure suffices, but it does not
resolve the problem of partitioning the household's actual fertility into the 'desired"
and the "unwanted" components.
figure plots only cells based on 20 or more observations. Unfortunately the cell
sizes for the users of poor contraception are quite small, making generalizations difficult.Contraception and Fertility
FIGURE 7
Variance in Live Births by Expected Number of Births by
Contraception Method and by Marriage Duration
69
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Mean and Standard Deviation of Live Births and Unwanted
Births for White Non-Catholic Women Aged 35 or Above
and Married Once, by Marriage Duration, Wife's Education,
and Contraceptive Method (Good, Poor, None)








Good 3.167 3.192 2.766 3.000 2.907
1.722 1.833 1.202 0.984 1.254
(6) (26) (107) (65) (204)
Poor 4.182 2.857 3.098 3.429 3.301
o.v 1.991 2.410 1.428 1.453 1.647
(ii) (11) (7) (41) (14) (73)
None 2.708 3.146 2.600 2.061 2.640
2.458 2.056 1.946 1.580 2.001
(ii) (24) (41) (80) (33) (178)
Total 3.171 3.135 2.768 2.777 2.866
2.290 1.988 1.543 1.327 1.657
(n) (41) (74) (228) (112) (455)
Unwanted Births b
Good 0.167 0.962 0.523 0.431 0.539
u,j 0.408 1.587 1.049 0.770 1.052
(n) (6) (26) (107) (65) (204)
Poor 2.091 1.714 0.512 0.714 0.904
1.921 2.563 0.952 1.139 1.474
(n) (11) (7) (41) (14) (73)
None 0.667 1.268 0.837 0.455 0.843
crc 1.341 2.013 1.354 0.905 1.480
(n) (24) (41) (80) (33) (178)
Total 0.976 1.203 0.632 0.473 0.716
1.573 1.916 1.155 0.859 1.311
(ii) (41) (74) (228) (112) (455).1
.1










Good 4.000 2.571 2.784 2.610 2.809
1.961 1.513 1.219 1.115 1.321
(14) (28) (74) (41) (157)
Poor 2.000 3.842 2.686 2.9 17 2.946
0N 0.926 1.642 1.430 1.379 1.525
(n) (8) (19) (35) (12) (74)
None 4.114 3.366 2.701 1.609 3.012
2.285 2.009 1.715 1.616 2.045
(n) (35) (41) (67) (23) (166)
Total 3.789 3.216 2.733 2.355 2.919
2.169 1.765 1.459 1.402 1.693
(n) (57) (88) (176) (76) (397)
Unwanted Births b
Good p.c, 1.571 0.571 0.311 0.171 0.433
1.910 0.920 0.720 0.442 0.942
(n) (14) (28) (74) (41) (157)
Poor 0.0 1.211 0.400 0.167 0.527
0.0 1.273 0.604 0.389 0.879
(n) (8). (19) (35) (12) (74)
None 1.971 1.561 0.881 0.391 1.211
2.419 1.988 -1.332 1.076 1.822
(n) (35) (41) (67) (23) (166)
Total 1.596 1.170 0.545 0.237 0.776
2.203 1.613 1.013 0.690 1.419
(n) (57) (88) (176) (76) (397)








Good 3.688 2.739 2.471 2.708 2.746
1.957 1.789 1.065 1.301 1.462
(n) a (16) (23) (51) (24) (114)
Poor 4.105 3.400 3.152 2.667 3.383
2.105 2.113 1.523 1.658 1.861
(n) (19) (20) (33) (9) (81)
None 4.240 3.580 1.932 1.706 3.184
a 3.004 2.548 1.680 1.359 2.646
(n) (75) (50) (59) (17) (201)
Total 4.136 3.333 2.406 2.360 3.098
2.724 2.295 1.516 1.439 2.217
(ii) (110) (93) (143) (50) (396)
Unwanted
Good 1.063 0.435 0.392 0.208 0.456
0L 1.843 0.896 0.666 0.509 0.961
(n) (16) (23) (51) (24) (114)
Poor 1.000 0.700 0.879 0.111 0.778
1.291 0.979 1.453 0.333 1.235
(n) (19) (20) (33) (9) (81)
None 1.733 1.400 0.644 0.353 1.214
crt 2.658 2.356 1.283 0.702 2.182
(n) (75) (50) (59) (17) (201)
Total 1.509 1.011 0.608 0.240 0.907
2.376 1.879 1.157 0.555 1.759




. .. .. . .. ...
a nindicatescell size. These figures are in parentheses.
"For definition see text. •41 Inaddition to Ryder and Westoff (1971), see Bumpass and Westoff (1970), Ryder
(1973) and Part IV "Unwanted Fertility" of Volume 1 of the Commission on Popula-
tion Growth (1972), particularly the essay by Ryder and Westoff (1972).
42 is,in the terminology of equation 16 one might define unwanted fertility as
N*or However,since 0,actual fertility N differs in general from
15N'so"unwanted" fertility presumably includes not only the discrepancy between some
fixed target fertility and optimal mean fertilitybut also the variation in actual fertility
around P-N•
NFS data contain retrospective information about 'the contraceptive behavior
and the husband's and wife's attitudes about another pregnancy prior to each of the wife's
pregnancies. Following Ryder and Westoff (1971) we considered each live birth as
"wanted" or "unwanted" on the basis of the behavioral and attitudinal circumstances
prior to that pregnancy. The birth was considered "wanted" if any of the following three
conditions was met: (1) The birth was "wanted" if the couple had used no contraception
in the interval prior to that pregnancy and responded "yes" to the question "Was the
only reason you did not use any method then because you wanted to have a baby as
soon as possible?" (2) The birth was "wanted" if the couple had used a contraceptive
method in the interval prior to that pregnancy and had "stopped using a method in order
to have a child." (3) If the couple was not using contraception but responded "no" to
the question quoted above, or if the couple had conceived while using a method or while
having stopped using a method but "did not want to become pregnant at that time,"
then the couple was asked two additional questions. If the response was "yes" to either
of these additional questions the birth was considered wanted. The two questions were
"Before you became pregnant this time did you want to have a (another) child some-
time?" and "Did your husband want to have a (another) child sometime?" Our defini-
tion of "wanted" differs slightly from the definition used by Ryder and Westoff.
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Thedemographic literature has emphasized a distinction between
"wanted" and "unwanted" fertility, and it is tempting to try to parti-
tion actual fertility into these two components for separate analysis.4'
The difficulty, of course, is in obtaining an estimate of wanted births
distinct from the household's actual fertility. The problem is not sim-
ply one of estimation. Viewed in the context of the stochastic model
described above, it is not possible, even in principle, to designate each
pregnancy as "desired" or "undesired." Also, we have emphasized
that the household's optimal number of children is affected by fertility
control costs (i.e., f34k in equation 16) and the relation between mean
and variance of fertility (i.e., —K/2). So the definition of "desired"
fertility depends critically upon what is assumed about fertility control
costs, the variance in actual fertility, and so on.42
Recognizing these limitations, we nevertheless attempted to con-
sider "unwanted" fertility since the NFS data set contains retrospec-
tive information on the couple's fertility goals prior to each pregnancy.
By summing up the number of pregnancies "wanted"43 and subtract-
ing this number from the total number of live births, we obtained an
estimate of the number of births "unwanted" in each household. Table
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tion, wife's education, and contraceptive method used in the first preg-
nancy interval. There appears to be a relatively strong negative rela-
tion between the number of "unwanted" births and the wife's educa-
tion level,44 and a somewhat systematic relationship between the
number of "unwanted" births and the use of good contraception.
We want to stress that the, results pertaining to unwanted births are
subject to many qualifications and are included here primarily as some
evidence that this one measure of the intuitively appealing notion of
an unwanted pregnancy seems to be related to contraception use as
one would expect. The arbitrariness of the precise definition of an
unwanted pregnancy helps convince us that it is more useful in study-
ing the uncertainty related to fertility behavior to focus on the dis-
tribution of actual births than to concentrate on partitioning observed
fertility into "desired" and "unwanted" fertility. We have 'shown in
this section that across broadly defined groups of households there
appears to be a systematic relationship between contraception strategies
and the mean and variance of observed fertility. Couples characterized
by the use of more effective contraception appear to have somewhat
lower mean fertility, lower variance of fertility, a weaker relationship
between their mean and variance of fertility, and perhaps a lower level
of "unwanted" fertility.
V. DIFFUSION OF THE PILL
The 1965 National Fertility Study and its sequel, the 1970 National
Fertility Study, provide a unique opportunity to follow, at the house-
hold level, the diffusion of a major technical innovation—the oral
contraceptive—from its introduction for sale in the United States in
1960. In addition to the intrinsic interest of studying the diffusion of
new technology, the observed pattern of adoption of the pill provides
an important test of hypotheses derived from our theory of contracep-
tive choice (see Section II).
There are two main reasons why the study of pill adoption provides a
more powerful test of our model of contraceptive choice than would be
afforded by studying differential choices among techniques existing
This finding is consistent with Ryder and Westoff's conclusion that "there is a
strong negative association of education and unwanted fertility" (see Ryder and West.
off 1972, p. 483). Their conclusion is also based on the 1965 NFS data and its sequel,
the 1970 NFS, which is not yet available to us. It must be stressed however that Ryder
and Westoff's definition of "unwanted" pregnancies and their criteria for selection of
the subsample studied differ from ours, and one should not make inferences about fer-
tility behavior from comparisons between their tables and ours.Contraception and Fertility 75
before 1960. First, the introduction of the pill was an exogenous event
from the standpoint of potential adopters. Second, the pill is a truly
new kind of contraception in comparison with alternative methods
available prior to 1960: itis significantly more effective and less
coitus-related than alternative methods. This second consideration
suggests that the pill has a significantly lower marginal cost of fertility
control than other methods, at least in terms of the psychic costs
associated with forgone sexual pleasure. Thus, couples were con-
fronted, after .1960, with a significantly different set of potential con-
traceptive methods to choose from, and we investigate in this section
the differential rates of adoption of the pill among women with different
initial conditions in 1960 (e.g., marital status, age, parity, and prior
contraceptive practices).
We first present a few hypotheses about the expected pattern of
diffusion, assuming that contraceptive choice is governed by factors
considered in our theoretical model. Next, we utilize data from the
1965 NFS to test these hypotheses and to estimate the probability of
pill use as a logistic function of the household's economic charac-
teristics, parity in 1960, and prior use of contraception.
The main behavioral hypothesis underlying our theory of choice of
contraceptive technique is that couples choose the least costly tech-
nique to achieve a given fertility goal (e.g., a given value of the mean
and variance of fertility outcomes). It was shown in Section 11(C) that
the same technique will not be least costly for all possible goals unless
the technique with the smallest marginal cost is also the technique with
the lowest fixed cost. This proposition led to the derivation of the con-
traception cost curve for a "typical" couple in Figure 3 as the envelope
of least costly segments of the curve associated with particular con-
traceptive techniques. According to this analysis, the more births a
couple expects to avert, the more likely it is to choose a technique with
relatively tow marginal cost and high fixed cost.45
To derive hypotheses about the adoption of the pill from this theory,
we shall assume that for most couples the pill has a lower marginal
cost than other contraceptive techniques available in 1960—65. Since
it is easy to provide examples of components of marginal cost which
are higher for the pill than for alternative techniques (e.g., money
cost, side effects on health, and so on), the plausibility of this assump-
tion depends on the further assumption that the major component of
Forthe time being, we shall ignore risk considerations and argue in terms of varia-
tions in expected fertility within an essentially deterministic framework.
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the marginal cost of contraception for most people stems from the
conflict between effective use of a method and sexual pleasure.46 The
fixed cost of the pill includes the cost of acquiring information about
its existence, characteristics, and method of distribution in addition
to the money cost of visiting a doctor to obtain a and
various psychic costs (e.g., religious principles) which are not related
to information acquisition.
We can use Figure 3 (page 47) to illustrate the hypothetical fertility
control costs faced by a typical couple. Recall that the line OF2 rep-
resents a zero-fixed-cost, high-marginal-cost technique such as with-
drawal, and line cs3F3 represents another technique such as the con-
dom. Suppose that the high-fixed-cost, lower-marginal-cost technique
depicted by ct4F4 represents the costs of the pill at the time of its
introduction on the market in
If Figure 3 depicts the cost conditions faced by a typical couple
newly married in 1960, the couple will adopt the pill only if it wishes
to avert all of its potential births (i.e., if it wishes to have zero chil-
dren). If the couple wishes to avert between seven and eleven births
(i.e., if it wishes to have one to five children) it will use the condom
as its contraceptive method. As the figure is drawn, if the couple wishes
to avert fewer than seven births (i.e., if it wishes to have more than
five children) withdrawal will be used as its contraceptive method.
The probability P that a couple will adopt the pill is equal to the
probability that the total contraception cost of using the pill is less
than the total cost of using the least costly alternative technique. This
statement may be expressed as:
P = <mm (Fr)] (17)
= + —li-Nfl< mm[aj + —IJ-N)]}
where=+ — isthe total cost of the pill and F, =
+ — is the total cost of the ith alternative method (i =1,
2,...). Ifall the a's, /3's, andwere identical constants for all
IUD, a close rival of the pill in terms of effectiveness and coitus-related costs,
was not widely available until after 1965.
While the line cr4F4 in the figure has a slope, or marginal cost /34,ofapproximately
zero, the cost curve for the pill could have been drawn with a positive although rela-
tively low marginal cost.
Also, for simplicity of exposition, we will assume here that these three techniques,
withdrawal, condom, and pill, represent the entire envelope cost curve. In our empirical
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members of the population, P would be either zero or one for everyone,
and the pill would be used either universally or not at all.
In fact, of course, these variables will be distributed according to
some joint probability distribution across the population so that we
should expect to find some fraction, 0P1, for whom the pill is
least costly. Moreover, our theory suggests that each of these varia-
bles is a function of exogenous variables as well as purely random fac-
tors. For example,is a function of husband's lifetime income and
wife's price of time, two variables which help determine the couple's
demand for children. Likewise,is a function of the couple's natural
fecundability and the wife's age at marriage, and the a's and are
functions of variables such as religion and education which determine
the fixed and variable costs of each contraceptive technique.
These considerations suggest that we may express the aggregate
proportion of households using the pill as
=JT;..J
Pr —mm(Ft) lxi,... ,x,,)<U]
x,,,u)dx1,...,dx,,du(18)
where Pr(.)isthe probability of using the pill conditional on the values
of the exogenous variables x1,...,x,,,which determine natural fer-
tility, the demand for children, and the costs of contraception, and
where u is a random variable and h(x1,..., x,,,u)is a joint density
function of the x's and u.
If we assume that u is distributed logistically and is independent
of the x's, the conditional probability of using the pill may be expressed
as a logistic function of the form
P={1+ exp {—(a+ b1x1 + ... +b,,x,,+ (19)
or, alternatively, the natural log of the odds of using the pill becomes a
linear function of the form
(20)
which can be estimated using standard maximum likelihoodproce-
dures. After discussing several hypotheses about the set of vari-
ables x1, x2,..., x,,, weestimate the parameters of logistic functions
of the form suggested in equation 20.
We shall first consider the pattern of pill use in a static setting in
which the distributions of natural fertilitythe demand for children,
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population. Subsequently, we consider the question of diffusion of the
pill over time. For convenience, assume for the moment that all couples
in the population face identical cost functions for the three techniques
depicted in Figure 3, but differ in their natural fertility or in their
demand for children. If couples are then distributed by the number of
births they wish to avert, Figure 3 implies that the proportion of
couples in the population which adopts the pill will be equal to the
proportion wishing to avert 11.5 or more births; the proportion which
uses the condom will be equal to the proportion wishing to avert be-
tween 7 and 11.5 births, and the proportion using withdrawal will
equal the proportion wishing to avert fewer than 7 births. In short,
given a distribution of couples by the births they wish to avert, the
switching points on the envelope total cost curve determine the pro-
portion of couples using the various available techniques.
We have suggested three sets of factors determining the proportion
of couples which might be expected to adopt the pill. We will consider
each in turn. Holding constant factors affecting the fertility control
total cost curve (the a's and /3's) and the demand for children (the lAw),
anyfactor which increases natural fertilitywill increase expected
births averted (B= — Thus for a group of households, an in-
crease inwill, ceteris paribus, increase the proportion of house-
holds using the pill (and decrease the proportion using withdrawal).48
The major observable variable related tois the wife's age when the
pill became available. So our hypothesis i.s that, ceteris paribus, the
older the wife was in 1960 the less likely she is to adopt the pill.49
In the simple three-technique case the effect on condom usage is uncertain, since
some who previously used the condom are expected to switch to the pill, while some who
previously used withdrawal are expected to switch to the condom. In the more general
case of several techniques, an increase in Bisexpected to increase the proportion using
the high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost technique. ceteris parihus.
49That is, the older she is, the shorter the remaining reproductive time span, so the
smaller her remaining natural fertility and thus the smaller her remaining expected
averted births. Since she wishes to avert fewer births, ceteris paribus, her incentive to
adopt the high-fixed-cost pill is relatively slight.
This hypothesis should be qualified in two respects. First, there may be an advantage
to postponing the investment in the fixed cost associated with pill adoption until the
benefits of the reduced variable costs associated with pill use are close at hand. If these.
benefits are greatest when the couple wishes to contracept with high efficiency in order
to prevent any additional pregnancy, the adoption of the pill might be postponed until
desired fertility is reached. Second, age at marriage is likely to be inversely correlated
with the couple's demand for children. So the younger the woman is at a given parity,
the more likely she wants to have a large family, which would tend to offset the effect
of age on expected births averted, unless desired fertility is explicitly held constant.
Thus our inability to hold desired fertility precisely fixed may introduce biases on the
other variables.
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Alternatively, if we hold constant natural fertilityand the fer-
tility control total cost curve, factors which increase the demand for
childrenreduce the expected averted births B and, therefore reduce
the probability of adopting the pill. In studies of completed fertility,
the husband's lifetime income,.H, and the wife's education, W (as a
proxy for her potential lifetime wage or price of time), have been found
to be the most important economic variables. Sanderson and Willis
(1971) and Willis (1973) argued on theoretical grounds for a positive
interaction effect between H and W.5° Estimating an equation of the
form
=+ -y1H + y2W + y3HW (21)
in a number of samples of United States women, they found that
and Y2 are negative andis positive, as expected. If we include these
three variables in the equation for P. since we hypothesize a negative
relationship between lAW and P, we expect to observe positive coeffi-
cients on H and W and a negative coefficient for HW.51
Estimating the effects on pill use of variation in the fixed and mar-
ginal costs of the pill and alternative methods of contraception presents
a number of difficult problems. These costs are likely to be dominated
by psychic or nonmarket components which may vary widely across
households but which cannot be measured directly. Certain variables
such as Catholicism are known to influence the costs of certain forms
of contraception, and it is frequently argued that education reduces
the cost of acquiring birth control information (see Michael 1973).
Unfortunately, both of these variables also help determine the demand
for children and it is not easy to see how this influence can be disen-
tangled from their influence on the cost of contraception.
50Brieffy, the argument is this. When the wife is not supplying labor to the market, the
shadow price of her time is higher than her potential market wage and is an increasing
function of her husband's income. When she supplies labor to the market, her price of
time is equal to her market wage and is independent of her husband's income. Since
children are assumed to be time intensive, the positive income effect of H on the demand
for children is offset by a substitution effect against children in families with nonworking
wives, while there is no offset in families with working wives. Since the wife's labor
force participation is negatively related to H and positively related to W, Willis (1973)
shows that the effects of H and W on number of children will be nonlinear with a posi-
tive coefficient on the interaction variable, HW. See, however, Ben-Porath (1973) for
alternative interpretations of nonlinearity in the demand function for children.
The husband's lifetime income and the wife's education are not, of course, the only
variables relevant for the demand curve for children. The demand curve used in the
previous section, for example, included several additional variables (see footnote 38)
and also pertained to white non-Catholics only. For the analysis of pill adoption in this
section, we again restrict ourselves to white non-Catholics.80 DemographicBehavior of the Household
One advantage of studying the adoption of the pill is the fact that
we may study the response to the introduction of the pill by women
whose initial conditions differed in 1960. This procedure enables us
to study the effect of prior use of other forms of contraception before
1960 on the probability of adopting the pill after 1960. The theory sug-
gests that couples which have incurred the fixed costs associated with
some other technique will, ceteris paribus, be less likely to adopt the
pill. Hence, we expect prior use of the diaphragm and condom, for
example, to be negatively associated with pill adoption.52 A second
aspect of prior use which may influence the probability of adopting
the pill is the success the couple has with the previous method. If the
couple's previous method has had high marginal costs, our theory
suggests that it would be used relatively inefficiently. The couple
would have, therefore, a higher risk of an "accidental" pregnancy
while using that method. Since the pill has a relatively low marginal
cost, the higher the marginal cost of the alternative method, the more
likely that the pill will be adopted. Consequently, we expect prior
"contraceptive failure" to be positively related to the probability of
adopting the pill. This expectation is strengthened by the likelihood
that couples which have experienced contraceptive failure confront
the prospect of larger losses of expected utility from additional "un-
wanted" births than do couples who have successfully contracepted in
the past.
While we have discussed three separate sets of factors influencing
the probability of pill adoption in a static framework, we have not as
yet considered the diffusion of the pill over time. A major driving force
in any process of diffusion of new technology is the reduction over
time of the cost of acquiring information about the new innovation. By
the simple act of adopting and using the new technique, early adopters
convey information to later adopters about the existence of the tech-
nique, how it is distributed, and so on. Since the pill is a prescription
52Thatis, after the fixed costs are borne, the fertility control costs fall from+B
tosimply $1B.Thereare difficulties in this test of the "sunk-cost" hypothesis, however.
A woman's prior contraception history is not independent of residual variance caused
by variation in the couple's demand for children, fecundability, or costs of contraception
which we are unable to hold constant with the other variables in the model. Several
potential biases tend to work against the "sunk-cost" hypothesis. For example, sub-
fecundity or sterility, which may be one of the reasons that a woman has not contra-
cepted in the past, would also tend to reduce her probability of adopting the pill. If this
bias dominated, we might find that prior users of contraception have a higher rather
than a lower probability of using the pill compared with prior nonusers.
....
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I,.Although they are not information costs, a similar mechanism may operate to reduce
the costs associated with deviation from group norms as individuals in the group witness
increased nonconformity with these norms. In the case of the pill, the interaction be-
tween the teachings of the Catholic church and the behavior of individual Catholics
might be interpreted along these lines (see Ryder and Westoff 1971, Chapter 8).
Hence, should a new contraceptive technique be introduced which further lowers
the marginal cost of contraception, our theory implies that the pill could be the first
technique to be displaced. Ryder (1972) shows that by 1970 pill use differentials by ed-
ucation, race, and religion had converged. Much of the convergence, however, was
caused by an absolute decline in the use of the pill after 1967 by highly educated white
non-Catholics, the group which has the highest rate of pill use. It is interesting to spec-
ulate whether new techniques such as the IUD and the increased popularity of the vas-
ectomy and tubal ligation had begun to displace the pill in this group. Ryder emphasizes
the effects of fears about long-term adverse health effects of the pill, but these alleged
effects were not widely publicized until the U.S. Senate Hearings in 1969, well after the
1967 peak in pill usage in the high-use group.
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drug, its adoption is affected by the diffusion of information among
doctors as well as among potential adopters. The dynamics surround-
ing the cost of information about the pill and the speed and pattern
of its diffusion will also be related to socioeconomic differentials in
rates of adoption, since this information is spread by word of mouth.53
To consider the effect of decreasing information costs of pill adop-
tion, we again make use of Figure 3 (page 47). With the passage of time
the fixed cost (which includes the information cost) of the pill for the
average household may fall from 0a4 to Thus the switching point
—thenumber of averted births at which pill adoption is warranted —
fallsfrom about 11.5 births averted to about 6 births averted, as the
figure is drawn. Obviously, in the aggregate, the reduction in the fixed
cost increases the proportion of couples using the pill. Notice that the
model implies that the users of the next-best technique will be those
who most readily adopt the new technique as its costs of information
fall over time. The new low-marginal-cost technique first displaces the
existing technique with the lowest marginal cost.54
To test the hypotheses advanced above, from the 1965 National
Fertility Study we have selected three samples of white non-Catholic
women who began their first, second, or third pregnancy interval in
the period 1960—64 (see Table 8 for a description of these samples).
In each sample we estimate the probability that a woman uses the pill
in the specified interval as a function of three sets of variables that
determine, respectively, (1) the woman's potential (i.e., natural) fer-
tility from the beginning of the interval until menopause; (2) the
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Thesevariables, which are listed in Table 8, may be grouped as
follows:
Variable (Expected Effect on P)
I.Potential fertility
Wife's age in 1965
II.Demand for children
Wife's education
Husband's income at age 40
Income-education interaction
III. Cost of contraception
(A) Date interval began
(B) Used diaphragm in previous interval
Used condom in previous interval
Used pill in previous interval
Used other method in previous interval
(C) Contraceptive failure in previous interval
IV. Age at marriage (+)
The sign accompanying each variable indicates the hypothesized direc-
tion of effect of that variable on the probability of using the pill in a
particular pregnancy interval. These hypotheses stem from the dis-
cussion on the preceding few pages, and most seem to, require no fur-
ther discussion. Note that the "date the interval began" operates as a
time trend in this analysis, so it is assumed to be negatively related to
the information cost of pill adoption. The prior use of other specific
contraceptive techniques is compared with prior nonuse of contracep-
tion, hence the fixed costs associated with each technique are expected
to deter adoption of the pill.55
We have estimated the probability of adopting the pill P as a logistic
'function of the form in equation 20 by a maximum likelihood method.56
"Onemight in fact offer hypotheses about the relative magnitudes of these negative
effects based on the assumed ranking of the fixed cost components (theof each. But
there may be persistent or serially correlated error terms across intervals, so we have
refrained from emphasizing this hypothesis. For example, couples which chose the
condom in the previous interval presumably did so for reasons only some of which we
have accounted for. Also, each technique has its own set of characteristics which may
be related to pill adoption (e.g., the diaphragm is a prescription method, so some of its
fixed costs which are related to a medical examination may in fact lower the fixed cost
of pill adoption).
computer 'program was written by Kenneth Maurer of the Rand
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The results are indicated in Tables 9 and 10. Two different versions
of the pill adoption model are investigated. First, we considered the
choice of pill versus all other techniques including no contraception.
These results are labeled as pertaining to the "total sample." Second,
we considered the conditional choice of pill versus all other techniques,
given that some contraceptive technique was used. These results per-
tain to the sample of "contraceptors." This latter dichotomy is the
appropriate one if pill adoption is characterized by the two-stage
decision: (1) contracept or not contracept and (2) select a contracep-
tive technique.
Table 9 indicates the estimates on the total sample for each of the
first three pregnancy intervals, excluding the variables which indicate
prior contraception use.57 The time trend (the date interval began) is
positive and statistically significant. This conforms with our hypothesis
regarding the effects of a decline in information costs over time. The
age of the wife has the expected negative sign in only the second inter-
val, while the age at marriage has an unexpected negative effect on the
probability of pill adoption.58
The effects of the variables related to the demand for children were
computed both with and without the income-education interaction
term. In all cases, the variables exhibited the expected signs. The
relatively stronger effect of husband's income than wife's education,
however, is quite surprising. In several studies estimating the effects of
these variables on fertility demand, the wife's education has the stronger
effect. The introduction of the interaction effect does strengthen the
effect of the wife's education in the first and third intervals.59 In gen-
eral, the signs and magnitudes of the effects of these three variables
tend to support the hypothesis that these variables affect fertility
demand and have an effect of opposite sign on the probability of using
not be grouped. Thus, the effects of a relatively large number of independent variables
may be estimated from relatively small samples.
estimates were computed on both the total sample (for the unconditional F)
and the sample of contraceptors (for the conditional F). The results were quite similar
in the two cases, so only the former are reported here.
Wehave no explanation for the consistently negative effect of age at marriage.
Holding wife's age and current parity constant, a higher age at marriage implies a shorter
duration of time from marriage to current parity. Thus, we think age at marriage in these
estimates may be positively related to relatively high fecundity, relatively high rates of
coital frequency, or relatively low demand for children, but each of these factors im-
plies a positive effect of age at marriage on the probability of pill adoption, ceteris
paribus.
The effect of the wife's education W on the probability of pill adoption in, say, the
third interval, is aP/6W =.084—.013H,which is positive at lower values of husband's


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates of Probability of Pill Use by White Non-Catholic
Women in Pregnancy Intervals Beginning in 1960—1964 for
Total Sample and for Subsample of Women Who
Contracepted during the Interval a
(asymptotictratiosin parentheses)
Second Interval ThirdInterval
Total Contra- Total Contra-
Sample ceptors Sample ceptors
(2) •(3) (4)
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a Seenote at bottom of Table 9.
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thepill, given the wife's age, panty, and the time sequence of the
pregnancy interval.
Turning to Table 10 the effect of prior use of contraception is
added to the estimating equations. The table includes the results for
the total sample and for the subsample of contraceptors. The effects
of the fertility demand variables, the information cost variable, and
the age of the wife and age at marriage variables are only slightly
affected by the introduction of the set of prior-use variables, so they
will not be discussed again here. The effect of failure in the preceding
interval is positive as hypothesized. The effects of prior use of the
diaphragm, condom, or other contraception are negative as hypoth-
esized in the subsample of contraceptors, but are seldom statistically
significant; the signs are not as hypothesized in the third interval for
the total sample. The expected positive effect of prior pill use is quite
strong in most cases.
While it is tempting to discuss in detail several of these estimated
coefficients, we will not do so here. We think the qualitative results
of our study of pill use offer rather strong support for the hypotheses
we developed earlier in this section. In addition, the model can help
us interpret the observed trend and differential use of the pill since
1960. In the preceding section we showed that the implications about
the relationship between distributions of fertility outcomes and con-
traception behavior are also supported by the observed behavior from
the 1965 National Fertility Survey.
APPENDIX




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Frequency Distribution of Best Contraceptive Method Ever







Pill 3.2 12.1 10.9 13.0 10.5
IUD 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.7 0.9
Condom 31.0 35.8 37.4 37.4 36.2
Diaphragm 2.6 14.6 18.3 27.8 17.3
Withdrawal 8.4 4.7 4.4 1.7 4.5
Jelly 3.2 0.9 1.8 2.2 1.9
Foam 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.5
Suppository 1.3 0.4 2.0 0.4 1.2
Rhythm 3.9 3.9 5.6 2.6 4.4
Douche 3.9 7.3 4.0 1.3 4.1
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
None 41.9 19.0 14.5 10.9 18.5
(155) (232) (503) (230) (1,120)
Wife Aged 45—54
Pill 0.0 0.0 2.4 6.6 2.2
IUD 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.4
Condom 24.0 32.3 32.0 35.8 31.0
Diaphragm 5.9 13.1 22.3 24.5 17.3
Withdrawal 9.9 9.1 5.3 5.7 7.1
Jelly 0.8 2.0 4.8 1.9 2.8
Foam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Suppository •2.5 2.0 0.5 0.0 1.1
Rhythm 3.3 3.0 .3.4 2.8 3.2
Douche 8.3 11.1 1.9 4.7 5.6
Other 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
None 44.6 27.3 26.7 17.0 28.9
(121) (99) (206) (106) (532)
a nindicates cell size. These figures are in parentheses.90 DemographicBehavior of the Household
TABLE A.3
Frequency Distribution of Best Contraceptive Method Ever Used






Pill 2.4 10.9 3.0 9.4 6.1
IUD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Condom 18.5 18.5 25.4 21.9 '20.2
Diaphragm 0.8 5.9 13.4 15.6 6.4
Withdrawal 4.0 3.4 6.0 3.1 4.1
Jelly 4.0 4.2 7.5 6.3 5.0
Foam 0.0 1.7 1.5 3.1 1.2
Suppository 1.6 3.4 4.5 0.0 2.6
Rhythm 0.8 0.8 1.5 6.3 1.5
Douche 12.1 8.4 9.0 12.5 10.2
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0;0 0.0
None 39.9 42.9 28.4 21.9 42.7
(124) (119) (67) (32) '(342)
Wife Aged 45—54
Pill 0.0. 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
IUD 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Condom 8.2 15.2 10.0 35.3 12.6
Diaphragm 2.1 3.0 15.0 0.0 3.6
Withdrawal 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Jelly 3.1 3.0 10.0 0.0 3.6
Foam 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Suppository 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.6
Rhythm 0.0 • 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Douche 19.6 21.2 5.0 11.8 17.4
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
None 64.9 48.5 55.0 52.9 59.3
(97) (33) .(20) (17) (167)
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TABLEA.4
Frequency Distribution of Best Contraceptive Method Ever Used





Pill 6.6 10.4 5.5 5.0 6.7
IUD • 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.4
Condom 25.5 17.4 18.3 18.4
Diaphragm 1.6 5.7 8.3 3.3 6.1
Withdrawal 21.3 11.3 6.9 5.0 9.7
Jelly 3.3 1.9 0.0 3.3 1.3
Foam 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.7 0.4
Suppository 0.0 1.9 1.4 0.0 1.1
Rhythm 13.1 16.0 35.8 38.3 28.3
Douche 6.6 0.9 2.3 1.7 2.5
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
None 37.7 25.5 22.0 21.7 24.9
(61) (106) (218) (60) (445)
Wife Aged 45—54
Pill 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.6
LUD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Condom 14.6 17.9 27.9 26.7 21.5
Diaphragm 6.3 5.1 9.8 0.0 6.7
Withdrawal 6.3 15.4 6.6 13.3 9.2
Jelly 2.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 1.2
Foam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Suppository 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rhythm 10.4 15.4 19.7 13.3 15.3
Douche 10.4 5.1 3.3 0.0 5.5
Other 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.6
None 50.0 41.0 29.5 40.0 39.3
• (48) (39) (61) (15) (163)
a n indicatescell size. These figures are in parentheses.S.
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Comments on "Contraception and Fertility:




MICHAEL and Willis have written a careful, and sometimes in-
genious, paper developing the economic theory of behavior regarding
the choice of contraceptive technique, deriving implications from
the theory, and putting these implications to the test of consistency
with observed experience
The paper examines intensively one decision among the array of ..
decisionsmade in households, which are perceived to be engaged in .
.. .
productionactivity. It is written in a context which has now come to .
.
beconventional, and which involves an extension of the theory of
the firm to household behavior According to this convention, house-
holds are viewed as being engaged in the production of utility, and this
:f .
utilityis postulated to be maximized subject to some cost constraint. ': -:•.• -:
Inthe abstract form most commonly employed, households produce
abasket of two commodities some quantity of the consumption ser-
vices of children (which is, itself, a combination of some number of
children and some distribution of what has come to be calledquality'
embedded in them) and some quantity of the services of goods (which 1 .•'. . -
isalso a combination of numbers of units of goods and embedded - .. -:
quality).Again, in the commonly employed abstract form, households .1.. •.,. ......
producethis basket of commodities by employing two inputs in com-
bination: time and goods. From here, familiar principles of equality
atthe margin and least-costing are applied to define optimizing rules
Of course, no actual household is presumed to have explicitly run
. ..
throughthe optimizing calculus. It is merely that when it is postulated ..... -. ...
thathouseholds do apply those rules, predictive statements can be -
.
-
madeabout the behavior of aggregates of individuals. Empirical work . -.
hasrevealed that these statements are fruitful in the sense that they .
.
are frequently upheld by experience. . . . .Contraception and Fertility 95
Since the application of the theory of the household permits the
derivation of implications about the number of children desired,
Michael and Willis begin there and develop a theory of fertility con-
trol which defines optimizing rules for choosing among alternative
contraceptive strategies.
Before explicitly discussing. various aspects of their work, I should
like to suggest two variants on the conventional literature of the theory
of the household which are antecedent to their work.
In the conventional literature, households are assumed to solve
the output-combination problem (some quantity of children's services
and some quantity of the services of other goods) as though children's
services can be produced only by own children. This is, of course,
not true. If utility is derived from the presence of children, or from
observing them, or from their being the object of one's tenderness,
or love, or care, or from forming them physièally or morally, then
utility can be procured from the children of others as well as from
one's own. The instruments for achieving this are myriad. Adoption
and foster parenthood are obvious substitutes for own children. But
one might also be a schoolteacher, a playground supervisor, a Little
League coach, a worker in a day-care center, a pediatrician, a Cub
Scout den mother or a scoutmaster, and so on. There are numerous
forms of association with children, both in markets and nonmarkets,
and, therefore, numerous forms of consumption of children's services.
All of these forms of consumption appear, in. principle, in the "other
goods" category in the conventional "children's services—other goods"
dichotomy. However, since these forms of consumption are more
perfect substitutes for the children's services of own children than for
other kinds of "other goods," it might pay to consider them explicitly
in this context.
This is especially true, because, in some respects, the consumption
of children's services through the medium of others' children is to
be preferred to the consumption of children's services through own
children.
Own children are usually kept by their parents, whatever their
quality. Criteriafor admission can be applied to the children of others.
If the child is autistic or hyperactive, too quiet or too noisy, too smart
or too dumb, he can be turned away. The preference set of the con-
sumer can govern. It may also govern for the consumer of children's
services from own children, but the differences in cost are enormous.
Parents will work for years to fashion the child into the form that will
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•..:
will know in hours whether she has what is, for her, the right set of
boys.
In addition, the consumer of the children's services of the children
of others has many more degrees of freedom in the allocation of time
to this consumption activity than has the consumer of the children's
services of own children. To illustrate, consumption may take place
during the day but not at night; in winter but not summer; during later
years of life but not earlier.
This introduces the second of the two variants previously men-
tioned. By and large, the conventional literature has treated time —
aninput in household production—as though it is a homogeneous
commodity. Gronau's paper (Journal of Political Economy, March/
April 1973) discusses the different prices of time for different subsets
of the population. What I suggest is that time is nonhomogeneous in
another respect: that, for a given population' subset (indeed for given
individuals and households), different units of time in the daily,
yearly, and lifetime cycles have different prices, which are determined
by the values of alternative activities in which units of time may be
employed..
If different time units do have different values, desired spacing of
desired births will be affected.
Thus, the explicit introduction of the two variants will affect de-
sired number of births and the desired time-distribution of births over
the whole span of life; it will, therefore, affect the definition of the
maximand which strategic fertility control behavior will seek to
achieve.
All of this is logically antecedent to the Michael-Willis paper, be-
cause while explaining the calculus of optimization which finally yields
some desired number of children in an ancillary way, the authors take
that number as a datum and proceed from there.
They have written a sensible paper of quite considerable power.
Households are confronted by a set of contraceptive strategies among
which they may choose. Strategies and households employing them
are more or less contraceptively efficient. No strategy and no house-
hold is contraceptively certain (except where complete abstention
occurs). Each strategy has associated with it a distribution of failures;
each has associated with it, therefore, a mean expected number of
conceptions and a variance around the mean. Households employing
a contraceptive strategy choose among different probability sets of
outcomes. Every strategy is costly. Costs have fixed and variable
components. The magnitudes of components of cost vary among
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population subsets. Households choose least-cost strategies.for given
probable outcomes.
The theory generates behavioral implications which are spelled out,
the implications are tested and, generally, the tests do not discredit
the implications.
Since, in treating their topic, Michael and Willis have done what
I think only a fraction of all economists would do-but what I think
any good, bright, well-trained economist should do—my comments
may appear to be quibbling.
1. There is some ambiguity in the notion of a "pure strategy." It is
formally defined as "the adoption of some form of fertility control
which sets [the monthly probability of conception] at some fixed level
(during fertile periods) for the entire reproductive span," but it is
sometimes used to mean an inflexibly unchanged contraceptive strategy
for the entire reproductive span. These are not necessarily the same
thing and will not be the same, if, for the fecundity of the
woman changes over time.
2. People do not talk very much about what they do in bed, so in-
formation is defective. Nonetheless, if inferences can properly be
drawn from a small sample, the use of a pure strategy in either of
these two meanings is not common. This is not to say, given the power
of abstraction and the fruitfulness of unreal postulates, that pure strat-
egies should not be assumed to characterize behavior. Indeed, the
authors say, where they assume pure strategies, that they do so for
analytical convenience. Unfortunately, implications derived from pure
strategy models might not be applicable in mixed strategy worlds. Or
indeed they might be applicable. Only empirical tests will tell, and thus,
the apologia appearing in the text may be superfluous.
3. The notion that the length of the reproductive period at risk is
altered by decisions about the age at marriage clouds one's perception
of the behavior of the unwed.
4. The paper assumes that the quality of a child is positively related
to the quantity of time and market goods devoted to him. Beyond some
point, at least, the relationship may be inverse.
5.Theexistence of fixed costs in adopting a fertility control strategy
turns out to have considerable influence upon strategic choice out-
comes. Since, at least for some strategies, the fixed cost consists of
reading the label on the box, it may be that this cost component is
overweighted in the paper.
6. The pill is said to have a low marginal cost associated with its







98 DemographicBehavior of the Household
or not) that adverse side effects will be generated by its ingestion,
and that the magnitudes of those effects will be a function of the quan-
tity of pills ingested. Nor is it clear, on the face of it, why the pill is
said to be a high-fixed-cost control strategy.
7. Some evidence that the authors believe supports the statement
that technique switching does not commonly occur in the United
States really seems to suggest something else. They say (p. 54):"90
per cent of women who used some contraceptive technique in the first
pregnancy interval (from marriage to first pregnancy) used a contracep-
tive in the second interval, while only 36 per cent of nonusers in the
first interval used a contraceptive in the second interval." This seems
only to say that the first set of women, having applied optimizing rules
the first time around, having sought to avoid conception and having
failed, now, in the second interval, applying the same rules and coming
to the same strategic outcome, still seek to avoid conception. The
second set of women, applying the same optimizing rules and given
the parameters of their experience, seek to conceive in the first inter-
val and, having succeeded, seek to conceive in the second interval
as well. The evidence does not seem to support a conclusion of no
switching.
8. It is not clear whether a household will choose the pill as its
contraceptive strategy if it is very important to it that its uncertainty
be diminished, or whether it will do so if it is very important to it that
the number of conceptions be diminished.
9. The authors explain differences in adoption rates of the pill by
women of different age classes at the time the pill first became available
(lower rates by older women and higher rates by younger women) by
differences among them in payoff periods for investment in the fixed
costs of adopting the technique. It would be useful here to take account
of different strengths of preferences for avoiding conception among
women of different ages.